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**Plan**

**The United States federal government should remove its restrictions on the use of reprocessing technology to create mixed oxide fuel for commercial nuclear power generation.**

**Prolif [1]**

**Adv 1 – Proliferation**

**U.S. influence in reprocessing is declining—status quo restrictions kill the technological capability to compete**

**Rasp 11 –** communications director for the Energy Institute at the University of Texas-Austin

(Gary Rasp, “Spent nuclear fuel is anything but waste”, Energy Institute at University of Texas at Austin, 2-20-2011, http://www.eurekalert.org/pub\_releases/2011-02/teia-snf021611.php)

Time has come revive long-dormant reprocessing program Failure to pursue a program for recycling spent nuclear fuel has put the U.S. far behind other countries and represents a **missed opportunity** **to** enhance the nation's energy security and **influence other countries**, the former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Sunday. Dale Klein, Ph.D., Associate Vice Chancellor for Research at the University of Texas System, said largely unfounded concerns and "long-held myths" about the reprocessing of spent fuel have prevented the U.S. from tapping into an extremely valuable resource. Spent nuclear fuel, which includes some plutonium, often is inaccurately referred to as waste, Klein said. "It is not waste," he said. "The waste is in our failure to tap into this valuable and abundant domestic source of clean energy in a systematic way. That's something we can ill-afford to do." Klein, who also serves as an associate director at UT Austin's Energy Institute, made his remarks Sunday morning at the American Association for the Advancement of Science's (AAAS) annual meeting, in Washington, D.C. Compared to other fuels used in the production of electricity, the energy density of uranium is remarkable, Klein said, noting that 95 percent of the energy value in a bundle of spent nuclear fuel rods remains available to be re-used. "The once-through nuclear fuel cycle, which is our practice in the U.S., is an enormous waste of potential energy," he said. Critics cite the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation as the biggest reason to oppose recycling. But such concerns are largely unfounded, Klein said. "While it is true that the plutonium in recycled nuclear fuel is fissionable, no country in the world has ***ever*** made a nuclear weapon out of low-grade plutonium from recycled high burn-up nuclear fuel," he said. "It just doesn't work for a strategic or a tactical nuclear weapon." While the U.S. has sat on the sidelines, other countries, including France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, and China have dedicated **significant resources** toward their reprocessing programs, Klein added. "**U.S. leadership in this area has been lost, and the underlying technological capability and intellectual capital needed to compete internationally have diminished to near irrelevance**." Reprocessing not only recovers significant energy value from spent fuel, it substantially reduces the volume and radiotoxicity of high-level nuclear waste. Today, U.S. utilities operating nuclear power plants continue to store spent nuclear fuel rods on site in pools of water, before eventually moving them to dry cask storage. And while there is some debate over whether the casks should be located in one central storage site, the practice is widely accepted as safe and secure. "That's another myth – that we don't know how to safely store nuclear spent fuel," Klein said. Establishing a program to recycle nuclear fuel will require a public-private partnership that operates outside normal Congressional appropriations and has a charter to manage the fuel over a period of decades, he asserted. The government's Blue Ribbon Commission, chartered by the Department of Energy, is charged with making recommendations for the safe, long-term management of spent fuel. The 15-member commission is to issue a draft report this summer, with a final report to be completed in January 2012. "At a time when we are seeking ways to limit carbon emissions from the generation of electricity, the recycling of spent nuclear fuel would appear to be a particularly good fit."

**Prolif [2]**

**Taking an active role on reprocessing reestablishes U.S. influence and allows us to shape global norms on recycling**

**NNSA ‘8**

(“Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives”, December 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GNEP\_NPIA.pdf)

Policy Impact: By taking an **active role** in spent fuel recycling, the United States would strengthen its ability to **influence** how **other countries** engage in recycling. In choosing to abstain from civil spent fuel reprocessing for the past 30 years, the United States aimed to influence other countries to make the same choice. However, some countries had already chosen to pursue civil reprocessing. The U.S. choice not to pursue that path reduces the U.S. ability to influence the policies and practices of those who do. Conversely, by choosing to pursue civil spent fuel recycling, the United States could increase its influence among those countries and over time establish a leadership role. Such leadership and influence could take several forms. First, the United States could **define and build consensus on** goals for spent fuel recycling. The GNEP Statement of Principles provides an example of successful U.S. leadership in this area (see text box below). Second, the United States could cooperate with international partners on Research And Development for technologies to achieve those goals, subject to constraints on the transfer of sensitive technologies (see Chapter 2). Third, by participating directly in developing the options for providing back-end fuel services, the United States could **set standards** that influence the choices of other countries, either as users or as providers of back-end services. By working to establish partnerships with other countries to offer a comprehensive package of nuclear energy and fuel cycle services, the United States could help define how those partnerships functioned to meet shared nonproliferation objectives through full actinide recycle.

**Other nuclear nations’ exports undermine any unilateral ENR restrictions—only getting competitive in the fuel cycle market bolsters nonproliferation**

**ANS 12**

(American Nuclear Society, “ANS adopts position statement on U.S. global nuclear leadership through export-driven engagement”, 7-2-2012, http://ansnuclearcafe.org/category/nuclear-fuel-cycle/spent-nuclear-fuel-reprocessing/)

ANS believes the U.S. should remain committed to facilitating an expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the export of U.S. nuclear goods and services. Exports of nuclear technology provide the U.S. with important nonproliferation advantages, including **consent rights** on U.S. manufactured nuclear fuel, the ability to **control the transfer** of nuclear technology, and **greater influence in** the nuclear policies of U.S. partner nations. The U.S. possesses a strong nuclear technology portfolio and supply chain. The federal government should be an active partner in helping U.S. industry maintain and increase its market share of nuclear goods and services, as U.S. nuclear exports have the attendant benefits of **improving global standards** of nuclear safety and security and minimizing the risk of proliferation. ANS believes that the U.S. should work with organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology and that a **competitive global market** for fuel cycle **services strongly discourages the spread of ENR** technology. Reasonable assurance of access to fuel and other services needed to operate their nuclear plants can dissuade nations from domestic development and deployment of ENR technology. The U.S. is one of several nations that are capable of supporting the development of nuclear technology in emerging markets. Those nations are **aggressively promoting** their nuclear technology with bilateral nuclear trade agreements that generally do not contain ENR prohibitions. Many U.S. partner nations are unlikely to forswear their right to pursue ENR technologies, even if they have no intention to develop them. Any U.S. insistence that its bilateral nuclear trade agreements ban development of indigenous ENR technologies would be **counterproductive to its nonproliferation goals and put U.S. technologies at a competitive disadvantage**. In short, a U.S. nuclear export regime that restricts rather than promotes U.S. nuclear trade will **ultimately reduce U.S. influence** in shaping the safety and security norms of the global nuclear landscape. In order to enhance U.S. nonproliferation goals through its export policies, ANS recommends that the U.S. government should: maintain a flexible approach for negotiating bilateral nuclear trade agreements (also known as 123 Agreements); continue developing a coordinated approach to promoting U.S. technology to other nations; and ensure U.S. nuclear export policies and procedures are transparent and responsive to the needs of the U.S. nuclear industry.

**Prolif [3]**

**There is no alternative to U.S. nonproliferation leadership—it leads to a vacuum that encourages brinkmanship, weak regimes, and crisis escalation**

**Ogilvie-White ’12** – senior analyst in international strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

(Dr. Tanya, “Position Vacant: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Leader, Asia”, PacNet, a publication of CSIS, Number 77A, 12-5-2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1277A.pdf)

During the past few weeks, there have seen some striking discussions in the international media about the future strategic order. One of the most interesting is an article by Ralph Cossa and David Santoro, which was originally published as a PacNet (PacNet #77, Nov. 26, 2012) and was then picked up by the Japan Times. Two short sentences half way through the piece particularly caught my eye: “The United States has limited power and influence to shape the major power agenda in the Asia-Pacific. The future of this agenda will be determined by decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad – not in Washington.” This is true over the longer-term, and the implications for world order are significant. It brings to mind William Walker’s new book, A Perpetual Menace, which raises concerns about the weaklydefined Asia-centric system of military engagement that is likely to replace the Eurocentric one. The big questions are: how will peace and stability be achieved as US preeminence wanes, and what values will underpin the new Asia-centric system? This discussion is becoming urgent, including in the nuclear context. One problem is that the existing nonproliferation regime has been largely shaped by the Eurocentric system (the Western powers and the Soviet Union/Russia) that is currently in decline. At the heart of this regime, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has expanded and deepened its original role, achieved almost universal membership and withstood serious challenges, primarily because its strategic and political value has been recognized by the states that have dominated the Eurocentric system. Of these, the US has had the most significant impact on the Treaty’s success: when it has offered proactive support, great strides have been possible; when it has dropped the ball, as it did most dramatically during the George W. Bush years, the consequences have been serious. As power continues to shift eastward, it is likely that the nonproliferation regime will eventually slip out of the United States’ grip. Critics of the US may welcome this development, but **the danger is that the leadership role will pass to a more ambivalent successor or be left vacant altogether**. In a world in which states still dominate, and in which international governmental organizations, legal frameworks, and norms are dependent upon the support of the most powerful states, this would have huge implications, threatening to unravel a **critical security regime** that has taken nearly 50 years to build. At the moment, it is not clear whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime can be embedded into an Asia-dominated strategic order. It is not even clear that Asia’s potential superpowers want this to occur, or whether they would consider a future of further horizontal and vertical nuclear weapons proliferation as fairer, more equitable, and possibly even more stable than the current uneasy compromise between nuclear haves and have-nots. It’s a worrying situation, which in the worst-case scenario could trigger the same kind of short-sighted and dangerous **nuclear brinkmanship** that characterized the early years of the Cold War. Only this time there would be some appalling additions: more powerful weapons, new platforms, fragile nuclear-armed states, and nonstate actors that seek nuclear materials for use in terrorist acts. What Asia needs is leaders who possess the right combination of influence, vision, and courage to champion non-nuclear norms and create and sustain nonproliferation and disarmament momentum. What Asia has is rather different. China has often shown a blatant disregard for nonproliferation instruments and norms, and is expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. India, which has steadfastly refused to join the NPT on the basis that it is discriminatory and does not serve its strategic interests, is linked into a nuclear triangle with China and Pakistan, from which it is unable and unwilling to detach itself. The only states in the region that currently show leadership potential lack the necessary strategic clout to back it up, and must rely on others. ASEAN is an important international actor in this respect, although it has not always been consistent where nonproliferation advocacy is concerned, and the organization’s future is increasingly vulnerable to divisive great power ambitions. Diplomatic coalitions that operate within the NPT review process are another important source of leadership, but – as Japan and Australia may discover in spearheading the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative – they are notoriously difficult to manage and even harder to sustain over the longer-term.

**Prolif [4]**

**The brink for nuclear proliferation is now**

**Rosenbaum ‘11**

(Ron, journalist, graduated Yale’s English Literature Graduate Program, “How The End Begins: The Road To A Nuclear World War III,” March 2nd, <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134203232/Ron-Rosenbaum-World-On-The-Brink-Of-World-War-III>)

And so by the time the Israeli jets reached the northeast corner of Syria and turned toward the Syrian reactor on the Euphrates, threats and counterthreats may well have been zapping through the ether and suddenly both nuclear superpowers with approximately five thousand land-based nuclear missiles on "hair-trigger" alert were on the verge of — only one misperception or hasty overreaction, one degree of separation away — being drawn into a potential regional **nuclear war**. Then there's the wild card, Pakistan, with its "Islamic bomb," which is shorthand for some sixty to one hundred warheads under the kind of loose, decentralized control that could allow a regional commander with ties to Islamic nations such as Iran and Syria to step in and set off another variety of **regional nuclear war** with equal **potential for escalation**. All those signals, threats, and counterthreats flashing through the night could easily have been known to the "very senior" British minister quoted in The Spectator, assuming he had access to GCHQ, Government Communications Headquarters, the legendary British signals interception facility, which, in tandem with the U.S. government's NSA (National Security Agency and its spy satellite system), can listen in to just about everything, even to secret military encryptions, in near real time. What the very senior minister was describing was perhaps the most perilous — and emblematic — crisis of the second nuclear age thus far: it is a new world in which the bipolar "stability" of the "balance of terror" has degenerated into a **chaotic state** of multipolar nuclear powers with **less control and** less **restraint** and a greater chance of touching off a regional nuclear war that could **escalate to global scale**. Nuclear proliferation scholar Benjamin Frankel tells us the "inherent complexity" of the new nuclear age "dooms multipolar systems to instability making them susceptible to crisis and war." "The world has arrived at **a nuclear tipping point**," a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study warned. "We are at the tipping point," former Senator Sam Nunn, co-founder of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has said, "and we are headed in the wrong direction." "The current global nuclear order," declared Harvard's Graham Allison, "is **extremely fragile**." Already India and Pakistan nearly used their nuclear arsenals against each other in 1999 and 2002. That was still bipolar. The Syria raid, however, was the most dramatic embodiment of the difference between the bipolar Cold War type of nuclear war close calls, and the new type of multipolar **chain reactions** that could reach critical mass in our new nuclear age

**Prolif [5]**

**And, proliferation would be fast**

**Heisbourg ’12 –** chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies

[François, chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?” http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1171&rtid=2]

**Ongoing proliferation differs from that of the first half-century of the nuclear era** in three essential ways: on the demand side, the set of putative nuclear actors is largely focused in the most strategically stressed regions of the world; on the supply side, **the actual or potential purveyors of proliferation are no longer principally the first, industrialized, generation of nuclear powers; the technology involved in proliferation is somewhat less demanding than it was during the first nuclear age**. Taken together, **these changes entail growing risks of nuclear use**. Demand is currently focusing on two regions, the Middle East and East Asia (broadly defined) and involves states and, potentially, non-state actors. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program is the focus of the most intense concerns. A potential consequence in proliferation terms would be to lead regional rivals of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in term: this concern was vividly in 2007 by the then President of France, Jacques Chirac (19) who specifically mentioned Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The likelihood of such a “proliferation chain-reaction” may have been increased by President Obama’s recent repudiation of containment as an option (20): short of Iran being persuaded or forced to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the neighboring states would presumably have to contemplate security options other than a Cold War style US defense guarantee. Given prior attempts by Iraq, Syria and Libya to become nuclear powers, the probability of a multipolar nuclear Middle East has to be rated as high in case Iran is perceived as having acquired a military nuclear capability. Beyond the Middle East, the possibility of civil war in nuclear-armed Pakistan leading to state failure and the possibility of nukes falling out of the hands of an effective central government. There are historical precedents for such a risk, most notably, but not only(21)in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union: timely and lasting action by outside powers, such as the US with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, and the successor states themselves has prevented fissile material from falling into unauthorized hands in significant quantities. Pakistan could pose similar problems in a singularly more hostile domestic environment. As things stand, non-state actors, such as post-Soviet mafiya bosses (interested in resale potential) or Al Qaeda (22) have sought, without apparent success, to benefit from opportunities arising from nuclear disorder in the former USSR and Central Asia. Mercifully, the price Al Qaeda was ready to pay was way below the going rate (upwards of hundreds of $million) for the sorts of services provided by the A.Q.Khan network (see below) to some of his clients. Although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions appear to be both more self-centered and more containable than is the case for Iran, the possibility of state collapse in combination with regional rivalry leave no room for complacency. More broadly we are facing the prospect of a multipolar nuclear Middle East, linked to an uncertain nuclear Pakistan already part of a nuclear South Asia tied via China to the Korean nexus in which nuclear America and Russia also have a stake. More broadly still, such a nuclear arc-of-crisis from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, would presumably imply the breakdown of the NPT regime, or at least its reversion to the sort of status it had during the Seventies, when many of its currently significant members had not yet joined (23), unloosening both the demand and supply sides of proliferation. On the supply side, “old style” proliferation relied on official cooperation between first-generation nuclear or nuclearizing powers, of which the Manhattan project was a forerunner (with American, British and Canadian national contributions and multinational scientific teams), followed inter alia by post-1956 French-Israeli, post-1958 US-UK, pre-1958 USSR-China cooperation. If India relied heavily on the “unwitting cooperation” , notably on the part of Canada and the US involved in the Atoms for Peace CIRUS research reactor, Pakistan set up the first dedicated, broad spectrum, cross-border trading network to make up for the weakness of its limited industrial base. This import-focused organization thus went beyond traditional espionage-aided efforts (as practiced by the USSR during and after the Manhattan project) or case-by-case purloining or diversion of useful material on the global market (as practiced by Israeli operatives). Even before the Pakistani network had fulfilled its primary task of supplying the national program, it began its transformation into an export-oriented venture. Libya, Iran, North Korea and a fourth country which remains officially unnamed became the main outlets of what became the world’s first private-sector (albeit government originated and ,presumably, supported)proliferation company which was only wound down after strong Western pressure on Pakistan after 9/11. Although **the** by-now richly documented **A.Q.Khan network** (24) appears to have ceased to function in its previous incarnation, it **has powerfully demonstrated that there is an international market for proliferation which other operators can expect to exploit**. Furthermore, budding, resource-weak nuclear powers have a strong incentive to cover the cost of their investment by selling or bartering their nuclear-related assets, including delivery systems. The fruits of state-to-state cooperation between Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are clearly apparent in the close-to-identical genealogy of their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of the No-Dong/Ghauri/Shahab families displayed in military parades and test launches. Not all such cooperation consists of televised objects. Even in the absence of game-changing breakthroughs, technical trends facilitate both demand and supply-side proliferation. For the time being, the plutonium route towards the bomb remains essentially as easy and as difficult as from the earliest years of the nuclear era. Provided a country runs a (difficult-to-hide) research or a power reactor from which low-irradiated fuel can be downloaded at will (such as CANDU-type natural uranium reactors), **reprocessing is** a comparatively straightforward and **undemanding** task. Forging and machining a multiple-isotope metal which is notorious for its numerous physical states and chemical toxicity is a substantial challenge, with the companion complications of devising a reliable implosion mechanism. Nuclear testing is highly desirable to establish confidence in the end-result. **Opportunities for taking the plutonium-proliferation road may increase somewhat as new techniques** (such as pyro-processing) **come on stream**. Developments in the enriched uranium field have been more substantial in facilitating proliferation. **The development of lighter and more efficient centrifuges make it easier for a state to extract enriched uranium speedily in smaller and less visible facilities**. Dealing with the resulting military-level HEU is a comparatively undemanding task. **The long-heralded advent of industrially effective and reliable laser enrichment technology may eventually further increase ease of access**. Downstream difficulties would still remain. Although implosion-mechanisms are not mandatory, they are desirable in order both to reduce the critical mass of U235 for a nuclear explosion and to make for a lighter and smaller more-readily deliverable weapons package. In sum, incremental improvements increase the risk of proliferation. However, non-state actors are not yet, and will not be on the basis of known technical trends, in a position to master the various steps of the two existing military nuclear fuel cycles, which remain the monopoly of states. Non-state actors would need the active complicity from (or from accomplices within) states, or benefit from the windfall of state collapse, to acquire a military nuclear capability. The threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be subordinated to developments involving state actors, a remark which is not meant to be reassuring since such developments (see above) are increasingly likely as proliferation spreads to new states and as state failure threatens in the ‘arc of proliferation’ extending from the Mediterranean to North-East Asia. Furthermore, non-state actors can be satisfied with levels of nuclear reliability and performance which states could not accept. A difficult-to-deliver or fizzle-prone nuclear device would not provide a state with the level of deterrence needed to shield it from pre-emptive or retaliatory action, whereas a terrorist group would not be seeking such immunity. A road or ship-delivered imperfect device, which would be closer to a radiological bomb than to a fully-fledged atomic weapon would provide its non-state owners with immense potential. The road to a non-state device does not need to be as well-paved.

**Prolif [6]**

**Proliferation causes nuclear war—motivates first strikes and deterrence breakdowns**

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**The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace** and U.S. national security **including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation**. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. **The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that** somewhere, someday, **there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction** and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but **it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again**. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. **Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first**. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. **In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability**. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. **Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal**, in this case Iran, **might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures**. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, **nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack**.[54] **If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second**. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. **Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war**. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. **We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, *one* leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD**. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. **By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down**. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

**Prolif [7]**

**And, accidental war is likely, even if an intentional one never happens**

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The proliferation optimist position, while having a distinguished pedigree, has several major problems. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.[34] Rather than repeat these substantial efforts, I will use this section to offer some original critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation optimism. First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and with complete sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and International Organization over the past few decades.[35] While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.[36] After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.[38] He argued that **leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can** make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[39] They can **engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange**. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”[40] This does not mean that **states** eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they **face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis** in an attempt to prevail, but only **at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange.** **Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises** (by my count, there have been twenty**) in which “rational” states like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very close to the brink of nuclear war**.[41] By asking whether states can be deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over say the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. **An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used**, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. **But, this** objection **ignores the** **fact** **that** **leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have *very strong incentives* to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders *purposely* do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate nuclear launch authority to low level commanders, purposely increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down**.

**Prolif [8]**

**The plan solves—having a domestic reprocessing capability allows for direct engagement over fuel cycle decisions globally**

**NNSA ‘8**

(“Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives”, December 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GNEP\_NPIA.pdf)

Direct Impact: The most attractive feature of these fuel cycle alternatives is that they reduce dramatically the long-term radiotoxicity from spent fuel. As shown in Chapter 5, removing all the transuranics from the waste stream (except for very low process losses) would shorten dramatically the length of time for radioactive decay to reduce the radiotoxicity of the remaining waste below that of uranium ore (see Figure 6.2). This represents an advantage over other alternatives in facilitating acceptance of other countries’ spent fuel both in terms of technical options for waste management and in terms of public acceptance and political feasibility of such fuel services, though neither public acceptance nor political feasibility would be certain. The significance of this advantage depends on the relative availability and public acceptance of disposal capability for spent fuel or HLW. The ability to recycle spent fuel and minimize waste would broaden the range of possibilities for U.S. participation in the global nuclear energy and fuel market, particularly for back-end fuel services. Accordingly, these full actinide recycle alternatives could provide the **greatest opportunities** for the United States to **influence international fuel cycle practices** through **direct engagement** in the international market. **If U.S. Government policy *permitted* U.S. nuclear vendors** to offer an attractive range of products and services, that would strengthen the U.S. ability both to influence the policies of other supplier states and to influence the practices of customers through U.S. consent rights. To the extent that they displace LEU as nuclear fuel, full actinide recycle alternatives also **reduce the demand for enrichment** compared to the other alternatives (see Table 6.2), because the reprocessed materials (actinides) would be used as fuel to generate electricity. As noted above, this could **reduce incentives and opportunities** for additional countries to seek to enter the enrichment services business. The full actinide recycle alternatives would reduce demand for enrichment domestically in the advanced fuel cycle states, which could make it easier for existing suppliers to meet international demands. This would contribute to the ability of suppliers to provide comprehensive fuel services that include both assured supply at the front end and assured acceptance of spent fuel at the back end. It is reasonable to expect that any spent fuel recycling facilities in the United States would be dedicated primarily to meeting domestic nuclear energy and spent fuel management needs. Conceptually, a portion of the initial recycling capacity could be made available for reprocessing spent fuel from other countries under assured “take back” of spent fuel arrangements. Given the expected limits on initial recycling capacity the United States would have to decide on priorities for addressing those international needs.

**Prolif [9]**

**We overwhelm other alternate causalities—enrichment technology is the largest internal link to proliferation**

**NNSA ‘8**

(“Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives”, December 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/GNEP\_NPIA.pdf)

The proliferation risk of once-through fuel cycles arises primarily at the front end, through the demand for large-scale enrichment to produce fresh fuel. This is a common feature of all the once-through fuel cycle alternatives under consideration. A possible variant of the HWR option could avoid the need for enrichment by using natural uranium fuel, as CANDU reactors have done historically, but this resulted in large amounts of spent fuel and less efficient use of uranium resources. The level of enrichment and the overall amount of enrichment (in terms of separative work units or SWU) required varies depending on the fuel cycle in question (see Table 6.2). The enrichment level is also relevant because it takes **less effort** to produce weapons-grade uranium starting from LEU reactor fuel than from natural uranium (which is significant only in the context of a very small enrichment capability – see Table 6.3) and because it may **complicate safeguards** at enrichment plants by making it harder to detect undeclared HEU production. For centrifuge enrichment, **there is no significant technical barrier between commercial and military enrichment.** A plant capable of producing LEU for power plants could also be used to produce high-enriched uranium (HEU) for use in weapons, either by enriching uranium in multiple passes or by reconfiguring the connections among the centrifuges to optimize for HEU production, or by diverting some of the LEU product to a clandestine enrichment facility. Effective international safeguards can be designed to detect such activities in a timely manner, and the risk of detection may also deter some countries from attempting them. 90 As with reprocessing, **a small-scale enrichment program**, for example a facility that provided fuel for a single large nuclear power reactor, **would be sufficient** to produce a significant quantity 91 of weapons-grade HEU in less than a month. Every programmatic alternative considered in the GNEP PEIS involves some growth in nuclear power and with that some growth in demand for enrichment services. However, the **primary proliferation** risk comes not from the total amount of enrichment. Rather, it arises from the possibility that additional countries might acquire an enrichment capability, which they could use to produce weapons-grade uranium (see Table 6.3). Furthermore, an increase in the number of countries holding sensitive enrichment technology would complicate efforts to prevent the further spread of enrichment capabilities. Therefore, if the demand for enrichment services is satisfied by an expansion of capacity at a competitive price in countries that already have commercial enrichment programs, there should be less proliferation risk associated with that expansion of enrichment capacity. At present, all planned new commercial enrichment plants would be built in countries that already have such plants. Nonetheless, a large and rapid expansion of demand for enrichment could **encourage additional countries to enter the market**, particularly if growing demand raises the price of enrichment services. This risk may be marginally greater for the once-through fuel cycle alternatives.

**Russia [1]**

**Adv 2 – Russia**

**PMDA cooperation with Russia coming now at DOE’s Savannah River Site ---- but a commercial MOX capability is key**

**DTRIP ’12**

(Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program, “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement”, 2012, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/synopses/pmda.aspx)

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), [long title: Agreement Between the Government of The United States Of America and the Government of The Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation] is designed to make **arms reductions irreversible** by ensuring that the United States and Russia transparently dispose of weapons-grade plutonium from their respective defense programs and, thereby, prevent the plutonium from ever being reused for weapons or any other military purpose. Under the PMDA the United States and Russia each agreed to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium by converting it into fuel for use in civil reactors that produce electricity. Combined, this represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The PMDA also provides that additional weapons-grade plutonium declared in excess as arms reductions go forward should be disposed of under the same or comparable transparency terms. In 2006, Russia announced its nuclear energy strategy. This strategy was incompatible with the 2000 PMDA. In 2007, Russia provided clarification of its preferred approach to the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. This clarification served as the basis for updating the PMDA via the protocol signed on April 13, 2010 by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The 2010 protocol enables each party to proceed with completing and operating the facilities needed to depose of weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities will **use the plutonium to produce electricity for civilian purposes**. In December 2010, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Russian Director General for the State Corporation "Rosatom” issued the Joint Statement on the Results of the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group Meeting, including the intent to create milestones by February 2011 for bringing the PMDA into force. On May 20, 2011, Russia's State Duma ratified the PMDA and its Protocols. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the amendments to the PMDA on June 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged diplomatic notes in Washington, D.C., bringing the PMDA and its Protocols into force. Weapons-grade plutonium, unlike weapons-grade uranium, cannot be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons. However, weapons-grade plutonium can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (**MOX**) fuel and irradiated **in civil** nuclear power **reactors** to produce electricity. This irradiation results in spent fuel – a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes. The protocol also prohibits spent fuel from being changed in the future unless it is subject to agreed international monitoring measures and is used only for civilian purposes. Both Russia and the United States plan to begin disposition activities by 2018. Potential Facility Impacts Key Verification Measures To provide confidence that the Parties are disposing of weapons-grade plutonium in accordance with the terms and conditions of the amended PMDA, disposition activities on both sides will be subject to monitoring and on-site inspection. The Parties met in the PMDA Joint Consultative Commission to clarify key elements of the PMDA’s compliance verification regime. Next steps include consulting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiating an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. In August 2010, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov submitted a joint request to IAEA Director General Amano for consultation regarding an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. As of July 2012, the two countries and the IAEA were making progress on appropriate IAEA verification measures for each country’s disposition program. back to top Current Activities Recent Developments The United States is expected to provide $400 million in assistance for the disposal of surplus Russian plutonium, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Moscow will fund the remaining balance, setting aside an estimated $3.5 billion for the effort. Next, the United States and Russia must **reach an agreement** on **milestones** for allocation of the U.S. contribution. To implement the PMDA in the United States, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is building a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. The facility will provide a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable to be made into MOX fuel. A Waste Solidification Building will handle the waste resulting from pit disassembly and MOX operations. When operational, the facility will be capable of turning 3.5 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel assemblies annually. The facility will be licensed for 20 years, with operations to continue into the 2030s. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is overseeing construction of the facility. It will be a hardened facility, similar to a nuclear reactor. As of June 2012, the MOX facility is scheduled to begin operation in 2016 and is more than 60 percent complete. Since construction began in 2007, more than 19,000 tons of rebar have been installed and over 118,000 cubic yards of concrete have been placed. More than 400,000 feet of process piping and nearly six million feet of electrical cable are currently being installed, while installation of the process tanks is 90 percent complete. Eleven of the sixteen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including a new electrical substation which was completed in September 2010.

**Russia [2]**

**Commercial MOX is critical to satisfy Russia in PDMA implementation**

**Wolfe ’12** – executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness,

(Clint, formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, guest column in the Augusta Chronicle, “Don’t Believe Environmental Groups About SRS MOX project”, 3-25-2012, http://www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208)

ANOTHER PERPLEXING statement in the article is: "The groups contend the MOX program's operating costs will exceed $10 million." Indeed, the project's own estimates are that annual operating costs of the facility will be on the order of $400 million, creating several hundred jobs for the next 20 years. I spent a portion of my career participating in deliberations concerning the disposition of plutonium pits and other plutonium-bearing materials. I can assure you that there is no responsible, low-cost approach to managing plutonium. Every proposed solution costs a lot of money and/or leaves the plutonium vulnerable to recovery for use in nuclear weapons, and that includes what we are doing now - storage and surveillance. The MOX project not only converts this material into a form that can never again be used for nuclear weapons but into a fuel that will produce $50 billion worth of electricity and will enable us to eliminate the expense of storage and surveillance of the plutonium in the future. From a societal point of view, we accomplish all of our stewardship and nonproliferation goals; eliminate the need for future costs of management of this material; and generate pollution-free energy. We should not forget the reason we are doing this. **We made a deal** with the Russians after the collapse of the Soviet Union to reduce the number of strategic weapons in our arsenals. **The Russians *knew*** that the MOX approach would **assure them** that the plutonium would not be used in weapons again. AS PART OF the same deal we agreed to buy enriched uranium from dismantled Soviet weapons. Those weapons once aimed at the United States and our allies now supply 10 percent of our electricity. These programs brought relief to a generation of Americans, Russians and people of all nations who had been living under the cloud of the Cold War, fearing the worst. The MOX project is an **incarnation of the notion of turning swords into plowshares**. We should rejoice that we have agreements that reduce the nuclear weapons threat while turning the weapons into energy for schools, hospitals, manufacturing and homes. One has to wonder how a legitimate "environmental" group can oppose a project that is such a perfect solution to the problems at hand. This project has not had a single environmental violation; has recorded more than 8 million work hours without a lost day because of injury; compiled a superb safety record; and the latest Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection reported that the project is up to all safety and quality standards. These groups complain that there are no takers yet for the MOX fuel. But when it is economical for utilities to use the fuel, agencies will buy it. It is a business decision. Getting paid for any of the cost of production of the MOX fuel is a bargain, as no other plutonium disposition option has any recovery-of-cost option.

**That’s vital to our credibility on nuclear issues with Russia**

**Wolfe ’12 –** executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness,

(Clint, formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, guest article in the Greenville News, 8-10-2012, http://www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208)

I would like to first consider his reference to cost vs. the alternative. The decision to make MOX fuel out of weapons-grade plutonium was reached after considering numerous disposition paths. Each of the alternatives had financial, technical or political shortcomings. Discussions with the Russians over how to dispose of plutonium became necessary after agreements between our countries in 1993 that provided for the dismantling of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. **Reciprocity was a given as a matter of trust**, and the Russians would not consider treating highly enriched uranium and plutonium as wastes. They maintained, and correctly so, that these materials were valuable sources of energy. As a consequence, blend-down of highly enriched uranium from former Soviet nuclear weapons that were aimed at us and our allies now provides 50 percent of our nuclear generated electricity in the United States today. This agreement already has netted a huge economic benefit to the United States and to any country with nuclear-generating capacity, as the cost of uranium for fuel has been moderated by this huge supply from the Russian and U.S. arsenals. The plutonium portion of the weapons agreements was slower in coming to fruition, but each country committed to an initial disposition of 34 metric tons with more possibly to follow. This represents about 50 percent of all the weapons-grade plutonium ever produced in the United States. Conversion of this material into mixed-oxide fuel will power a million homes for more than 50 years, and that energy is worth tens of billions of dollars. Choosing to **delay or cancel the MOX** project would require revisiting **all the old alternatives**, including surveillance, and all of them cost a lot of money. Add to that the **potential for our treaty partners to take exception to our reneging**, and we introduce the possibility of the ***loss of credibility*** in a crucial area of our foreign policy. The Russians were **suspicious** of proposed disposition paths that left the plutonium in a recoverable state.

**Russia [3]**

**Just having the Savannah River Site isn’t enough—without a credible commitment to commercial MOX South Carolina will shut down the plant**

**Bunn ‘7**

(Matthew, “Troubled Disposition: Next Steps in Dealing With Excess Plutonium”, Arms Control Association, April 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_04/Bunn)

A wide range of other obstacles have contributed to these slowing schedules and escalating costs. After delays resulting from a year-long Bush administration policy review, the Bush team delayed matters further by demanding that Russia accept liability provisions that would make Russia liable even for damage caused by intentional sabotage by U.S. personnel, a provision Russian negotiators predictably rejected. **Because construction of the U.S. and Russian MOX plants had been linked**, this dispute resulted in years of delay in both countries. A liability protocol for plutonium disposition, in which the Bush administration effectively abandoned its earlier demands, was finally signed in September 2006, ironically not long after the linkage between U.S. and Russian construction was dropped. Most U.S. officials believe that the U.S. excess plutonium stockpile poses few security issues and see getting rid of Russia 's excess plutonium stockpile as the main reason to bother with getting rid of the U.S. excess stockpile. The other major driver for the U.S. disposition effort is South Carolina, which would only allow the Energy Department to consolidate many of its plutonium stockpiles at Savannah River **if there was a *clear plan*** to do **something with these stocks that would provide jobs and** ultimately **take them back out of the state**. Congress has passed legislation that requires the Energy Department to pay substantial fines to the state if it does not meet plutonium disposition deadlines.

**Immediacy is key—parallel implementation with Russia is a key tenant of the agreement**

**American Journal of International Law ’10**

(United States, Russia Conclude New Agreement on Plutonium Disposal, Vol. 104, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 680-681, LexisNexis)

Weapon-grade plutonium, unlike weapon-grade uranium, cannot be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons. But it can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. This irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes and a form that the Protocol prohibits being changed any time in the future unless subject to agreed international monitoring measures and only for civil purposes. The amended PMDA will provide that this weapon-grade plutonium be disposed by irradiating it in light water reactors in the United States and in fast-neutron reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions in the Russian Federation. The U.S. MOX fuel fabrication facility being constructed at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site is planned to begin operation in 2016; Russia has already fabricated MOX fuel on a limited basis and is in the process of constructing/modifying fuel fabrication facilities capable of producing MOX fuel at levels required to meet the PMDA’s disposition rate. Both countries plan to begin disposition by 2018. The PMDA does not call for strict linkages in the timing of their respective programs, but **both countries are to seek to proceed in parallel** to the extent practicable.

**Plan spills over after the PMDA expires**

**Sokova ’10** – research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies

(Elena, “Plutonium Disposition”, NTI, 9-16-2010, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/plutonium-disposition-14/>)

The 2010 protocol to the PMDA represents a **significant step forward**, but the agreement itself is limited in scope. Once the two countries have disposed of the required 34 metric tons, significant quantities will remain. The United States will continue to possess 16 tons of excess military plutonium in various waste and fuel forms, while Russia will retain at least 16 tons of weapons-grade plutonium declared excess to its defense program. These numbers are **likely to increase** once the two parties begin dismantling their nuclear arsenals under the 2010 START follow-on treaty. However, the United States and Russia can continue plutonium disposition beyond 34 metric tons should they wish to do so and the existence of an ***operational infrastructure* for MOX fuel fabrication makes this possible.**

**Russia [4]**

**Plutonium cooperation solves broader relations**

**Luongo ‘7** -- executive director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

(Kenneth N., “Improving U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation”, Partnership for Global Security, 2007, <http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/publications/Articles%20and%20Commentary/improving_nuc_coop.html>)

Expediting fissile material disposition and elimination. Although programs that support the disposal of excess fissile materials in the United States and Russia have shown progress, there is room, and need, for improvement. The Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement could be expanded to handle more than the current allotment of 500 metric tons. The plutonium disposition program, now in **political limbo**, could be put **back on track** so that **implementation can proceed as scheduled**. In addition, the United States and Russia should begin to determine how much more plutonium is excess and could be eliminated. Ending plutonium production in Russia. Continuing plutonium production for both military and commercial purposes adds to the already significant burden of improving nuclear material security in Russia. Steps should be taken to end this production expeditiously. Russia has three remaining plutonium-producing reactors, which currently produce approximately 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium per year. However, the reactors also provide heat and energy for surrounding towns, and in order to shut them down, other energy sources must be provided. In 2000, Congress prohibited the use of funds to build alternative fossil-fuel energy plants at these sites, the method preferred by both Russia and the United States for replacing the nuclear plants. The estimated cost of the new plants is on the order of $420 million. Congress should lift its prohibition and provide funding for building the replacement plants. Also, Congress should provide funds to enable the United States and Russia to continue their work on an inventory of Russia's plutonium production. Finally, Congress should authorize and fund incentives to help end plutonium reprocessing in Russia. In 2000, program officials requested about $50 million for a set of projects to provide Russia with an incentive to end its continued separation of plutonium from spent fuel. But Congress approved only $23 million, and the Bush administration's proposed budget eliminated all funding. These programs should be reconstituted. There is no question that U.S.-Russian nuclear relations need to be adapted to the 21st century. The foundation for this transition has been laid by the endurance and successes of the cooperative security agenda. Today, each country knows much more about the operation of the other's weapons facilities. Technical experts cooperate on topics that were once taboo. And the most secretive weapons scientists in both nations have become collaborators on efforts to protect international security. Both nations must now recognize that more progress is needed and that it can be built on this ***foundation* of achievement**--if, in fact, elimination of the **last vestiges of Cold War** nuclear competition and the development of effective cooperation in fighting future threats is what the United States and Russia truly seek.

**Russia [5]**

**That prevents nuclear war**

**Lukyanov ’11**

(Fyodor, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Politics magazine, “Nuclear destruction remains the basis of relations”, The Telegraph, 1-5-2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/8241050/Nuclear-destruction-remains-the-basis-of-Russia-US-relations.html)

When President Dmitry Medvedev warned in his latest state-of-the-nation address that a new arms race could begin in the next decade, the hall erupted in applause. No wonder. For many of the Russian senators in the audience, that term calls to mind their younger years, something pleasant in and of itself. Added to which many people on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems, sorely miss those “good old days” when everything was clear: two worlds, two systems, and explicit rules of the game.¶ One finds oneself thinking of the advantages of a systemic confrontation, given the political and legal free-for-all into which the planet has been sinking ever since.¶ But reminiscences aside, what did the president mean? And we should consider that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also said in his recent interview with Larry King that an arms race would lead not only to the failure of the anti-missile defence shield but also to the non-ratification of Start II. The latter is doubtful: that agreement is not of such calibre. But as for the anti-missile defences, Moscow’s logic is understandable.¶ The question remains: can Russia and the US break the vicious circle of mutual nuclear containment, or will this type of relationship, frankly absurd today, be preserved in future?¶ Whatever Moscow and Washington do, the material and technological basis of their relations remains not simply restraint, but Mutually Assured Destruction. Another use for the vast arsenals they amassed up to the late Eighties simply does not exist. No international problem requires such a quantity of nuclear charges and missiles. The political logic of that period has long since lost its force; the whole world has changed. But you can’t argue with weapons: the **logic of arsenals still dictates**, no matter how often Russia and the United States reiterate that they no longer see each other as adversaries.¶ A quick liquidation of stockpiles will not be achieved. First of all, strategic nuclear forces are mainly political weapons and a matter of status. No one will simply give these up. This is especially true of Russia, which no longer has any other features of a superpower. And, judging by discussions underway in Washington, idealists there are being squeezed on all sides, too.¶ Second, one needs at the very least a **qualitatively different level of trust** between Russia and the United States; the first shoots that appeared during the “reset” may very soon be trampled.¶ And finally, the time when these two giants set the tone in the nuclear sphere has long since past. Proliferation goes on, quietly. China’s nuclear arsenal, though only a fraction of Russia’s and America’s, is becoming an increasingly important factor in that country’s growing influence. Neither Washington nor Moscow can allow the other to be in the same “league” with Beijing because then the counterweights to its influence would be even less.¶ Nevertheless, the needlessness of assured destruction is obvious, and this situation must be somehow overcome. The only way is a gradual rapprochement in the strategic sphere which will make the nuclear containment of Russia and the United States an anachronism. And for this, joint work on anti-missile defences would be ideal. If this is undertaken in earnest, sooner or later it will become apparent that missiles aimed at each other are patently absurd given that the “adversaries” are building a joint shield. This is a long, hard road, the success of which, though not guaranteed, is none the less possible. Especially when one realises the real threats facing both countries in the 21st century.¶ On the other hand, it’s obvious what will happen if, in the sphere of anti-missile defence, nothing comes together and they each go their own way. In that case, the **old** type of **relations** will **inevitably recur** since that same nuclear rubicon will be preserved. An American missile defence system would be built against any other country possessing missile potential, including, of course, Russia – even if Russia were not the main object. Moscow would then automatically begin searching for ways of overcoming that anti-missile shield.¶ No one will abolish mutual nuclear deterrence as the basis of balance so long as the two nuclear superpowers are not engaged in a common cause. All of this goes beyond the bounds of rational argument, but the burden of arsenals aimed at one another will continue to **return** us **to** the **confrontation** of 30 years ago, even if in a farcical form.¶ One must not forget that all this is a game of nerves. These gigantic arsenals are inapplicable; the anti-missile system is virtual since most likely it will never be created. The paradox is that the political effect of the idea of an anti-missile shield is more than real since it touches the heart of the problem of strategic stability.¶ To imagine an arms race of the classic kind that existed in the latter half of the 20th century is impossible. The entire developed world is too concerned with budget deficits and national debt: in reality these problems represent a far greater threat to stability than do any classic threats. True, in that situation nuclear weapons regain the significance they seemed to be losing. Meanwhile, Nato’s just-published strategic conception clearly states that nuclear weapons, primarily American, are that alliance’s supreme guarantee of security. So say goodbye to a non-nuclear world. And in the United States, where only recently there was talk of investing in hi-tech conventional weapons of a new generation, cost estimates now show that preserving the nuclear component would be cheaper.¶ Be that as it may, anti-missile defence represents a fork in the road: one way leads to a new system of relations between Russia and the United States, with both sides ceasing to view the other as a strategic threat; the other leads back to a model of the Cold War – albeit a wittingly senseless one.

**Russia [6]**

**And, plutonium cooperation is key to cooperative threat reduction**

**Plutonium cooperation will build on START**

**Clinton and Lavrov ’10**

(Secretary of State and Russian Foreign Minister, “Signing of the Plutonium Disposition Protocol”, Mission of the United States Geneva Switzerland, 4-13-2010, <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/04/14/signing-pmda/>)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon, and let me state the obvious. I am very pleased that Foreign Minister Lavrov and I are able to do this together. We have had many meetings over the past 15 months and I always look forward to a productive discussion, a candid exchange of views, and a determination to make progress together. **This is an *historic time* for U.S.-Russian relations**. Last week, our presidents signed the new START treaty, which will make our two countries and the world safer and more secure by reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons in our stockpiles. And this week, we’ve gathered with representatives from more than 45 nations to address the urgent global threat posed by vulnerable nuclear material. And now, we are taking another step to increase our mutual security and **deepen** our **bilateral cooperation**. Under the agreement we are about to sign, the United States and Russia will each irreversibly and transparently dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Together, that is enough material for nearly 17,000 nuclear weapons. And we will put in place the **framework and infrastructure needed** to dispose of even more plutonium from defense programs in the future. The agreement provides for monitoring and inspections that will ensure that this material will never again be used for weapons or any other military purpose. By using civil nuclear reactors to dispose of the plutonium, we gain an added benefit – to produce electricity for our people, even as we remove a potential serious danger. And I want to thank the two teams from both Russia and the United States who worked together to hammer out this agreement. I see familiar faces, both from my country and now, after so many meetings, familiar faces from Russia. And Minister Lavrov and I could not be standing here without the extraordinary expertise and commitment that these teams brought to this occasion. Thank you very much. FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: Thank you. And I believe that the protocol which we are about to sign, the protocol to the agreement on utilization of weapon-grade plutonium, the agreement of the year 2000, actually, signed at that time but not implemented because of some technical reasons – the protocol which we are signing today is going to remove those technical impediments and obstacles, and the agreement would be implemented in practical terms. Thirty-four tons of plutonium, which the United States and Russia each would utilize, is a lot. It’s certainly a step in the direction of our shared goal of nuclear disarmament, because apart from actual limitations and reductions in nuclear strategic offensive arms, **you need to do something about the plutonium which is released because of that process**. And the event which you are witnessing here today is of – well, maybe not less important, but certainly it’s of very significant importance. And we would be doing this process, we would be doing these – implementing these obligations transparently, as the Secretary said, and in the way which would absolutely preclude military use of this plutonium in the future and which ensure its effective and safe usage for peaceful purposes to produce nuclear energy. And we certainly consider that this step is the contribution by the Russian Federation and the United States towards the implementation of Article Six of the Nonproliferation Treaty. When this mechanism starts working, we expect its positive influence on the process of nonproliferation, including making the process of nuclear disarmament multilateral at some point, hopefully not very far from today. And this is what we believe is the significance of this event. To utilize 34 metric tons of plutonium in Russia, the Russian Government will spend approximately $2.5 billion and we are grateful to the United States for contributing to this program by providing up to $400 million for this particular program. Thank you very much, and I join the Secretary in thanking the teams which negotiated this agreement.

**Russia [7]**

**That’s key to secure Russian loose nukes**

**NTI ’12**

(“Success Touted in Securing Former Soviet Nukes”, 1-9-2012, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-touts-success-securing-former-soviet-nukes/>)

Former U.S. officials and experts are taking stock of a **successful collaborative effort** **with Russia** to prevent rogue actors from acquiring nuclear weapons in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union two decades ago, the Associated Press reported on Sunday (see GSN, Nov. 16, 2011). When the former superpower collapsed, its long-range nuclear arsenal was spread between Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The United States was able in short order to persuade the three smaller states to repatriate their nuclear warheads to Russia. The United States paid for the weapons' physical protection during a period when the former Soviet states lacked the necessary funds to do so themselves. "Twenty years on it's pretty hard to believe that not a single nuclear weapon has shown up loose," said Clinton administration Assistant Defense Secretary Graham Allison. A willingness by Washington to spend billions of dollars to finance the nuclear security effort through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, common nonproliferation goals between Washington and Moscow, and the commitment of Russian military officers are generally credited with ensuring that **no "loose nukes"** were acquired by hostile regimes or extremist groups. "The [Russian] military officers who did the job were the unknown heroes," Russian analyst Alexander Golts said. "It's hard to imagine what might have happened if the tactical nuclear weapons had remained on the territories of the states involved in military conflicts." Despite sometimes not being paid, Russian military officers did not ease up in guarding the nation's nuclear stockpile. "People realized their responsibility because they were fully aware of the dangers," retired Russian Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin said. The first priority for Russia was to withdraw thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons from the former Soviet states. These artillery rounds and other weapons were generally small and deployed in regions close to trouble zones and thus posed the top proliferation concern. The secondary concern was to withdraw the long-range warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. While Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed in short order to give up their nuclear weapons, Ukraine initially refused. In 1992, though, the Ukrainian government recognized it lacked both the resources and the technical know-how to maintain its status as a nuclear-armed nation. It agreed to send the long-range weapons back to Russia, but only following years of strained negotiations. "There was a lot of pressure, they threatened us with all kinds of economic sanctions, they wanted to get this issue over with fast," former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said in an interview with AP. "It seems to me that Nunn-Lugar was one of the smartest uses of defense dollar we ever made," Pifer said, in reference to the Cooperative Threat Reduction program sponsored by then-U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). The program, which continues today, has supplied specially strengthened train cars to transport the nuclear weapons over land and security technology for stored warheads, along with financing to dismantle thousands of retired nuclear weapon-delivery systems (see GSN, Dec. 22, 2011). "The program provided **colossal support**," Dvorkin said. There have been worries over the years that several warheads might have been lost. However, insiders said the international community would have found out by now if some weapons had slipped out of Russian state control. "If somebody or a terrorist group got hold of a nuclear weapon, they would probably use it as quickly as possible," former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Piper said. "So **the fact that you haven't seen a nuclear detonation** ... reflects the fact that the nuclear weapons have been maintained in a secure way."

**Russian loose TNWs are the most likely source of terrorist theft**

**Conolly ’12**

(Catherine, MA candidate at King’s College London, “The Threat To The West From Soviet Nukes”, 2-12-2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/02/threat-to-west-from-soviet-nukes-html/#ixzz28GLMDMoR)

Fissile Materials Russia produces the world’s largest stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and whilst security at many of the sites storing this material has been modernised, not all sites are adequately secured. At the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia also left tonnes of this fissile material in extremely inadequately secured storage sites in the former Soviet countries. During the 1990’s there was a huge amount of HEU and plutonium stolen from such sites, with one Russian prosecutor stating that “potatoes were guarded better” than the nuclear materials at one site. In one instance, it was reported that a Russian Naval officer walked into a military base through a hole in the fence, opened the padlock on a shed, and walked away from the site with ‘several kilograms of HEU in his backpack’. There is ‘ample evidence of **significant black-market trade** in nuclear materials’, and weapons-grade plutonium and HEU being sold illicitly **have been seized by authorities** on a number of occasions. For example, in March of 2010 three men were arrested attempting to sell HEU in Georgia; the HEU is believed to have originated in a nuclear fuel plant in Siberia. There have almost certainly been instances in which the materials **have not been intercepted by authorities** before it came into the possession of non-state actors. What This Means for the West The risk of non-state actors or rogue nations acquiring a nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to create an improvised nuclear device is very real. The lax security at Russian and former Soviet storage sites is of great cause for concern; we already know that huge amounts of fissile material have been stolen and are readily available on the black-market, whilst the fact that there is no confirmed evidence of tactical nuclear weapons being stolen or sold is little cause for comfort.

**Russia [8]**

**Terrorist theft of Russian TNWs leads to nuclear first strikes and destroys Moscow**

**Dunlop and Smith, 2006** (William, scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and Harold, distinguished visiting scholar and professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, “Who did it? Using international forensics to detect and deter nuclear terrorism,” Arms Control Today, October 1, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006\_10/CVRForensics

Among these, Moscow perhaps presents the most compelling case for international cooperation on post-detonation nuclear forensics. Russia has the largest stockpile of poorly secured nuclear devices in the world. It also has porous borders and poor internal security, and it continues to be a potential source of contraband nuclear material and weapons, despite the best efforts of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. If terrorists obtained the nuclear material in Russia and set Moscow as their target, they would not have to risk transporting the weapon, stolen or makeshift, across international borders. Attacks by **Chechen terrorists** in Beslan and at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow offer ample proof that a **willingness to commit mass murder** for fanatical reasons rests within Russian borders, and a foreign source of operatives, particularly from the neighboring Islamic states to the south, is by no means inconceivable.[2] Moscow is also a predominately Christian city where local authorities routinely discriminate against Muslim minorities. Furthermore, extremists might conclude that a nuclear blast in Moscow could inflict damage well beyond that directly stemming from the attack. The Soviet generation that came to power during the Cold War retained a memory of the United States as an ally in the Great Patriotic War. The present Russian generation has no such remembrance but seems to have retained the animosities and suspicions that were a part of the nuclear standoff. Hence, nuclear terrorists may well believe that they could cause another East-West cold war or even encourage Russia to **retaliate against the U**nited **S**tates. After all, the sinking of the Kursk was believed by some influential Russians to be the result of U.S. action.[3] How much more likely would be such a view if the Kremlin were destroyed? As long as the world is filled with suspicion and conflict, such reactions are to be expected and, more importantly, anticipated.[4] One has only to remember the early reactions and suspicions in the United States following the 1996 TWA Flight 800 airline disaster.[5]

**That would trigger the Dead Hand—makes nuclear war inevitable**

**CNANW, 09** (Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “Questions and Answers on "RLOAD" and De-alerting”, <http://www.web.net/~cnanw/index.htm>, Accessed 10/6)

On the Russian side**,** command of nuclear weapons is said to be very centralized and strictly controlled. However,they have notin recent timeshad both the radar and the satellite warning systems available all the time because too few satellites are orbiting and some of the radars built by USSR are now in independent States**;** sothey must berelyingon only one system for part of the time. They alsohave a "dead hand" system codenamed 'Perimetr', which comprises non-armed rockets that can be **launched automatically** and fly over Russia broadcasting launch codes and launch orders to the missile silos. This is meant to be activated automatically(after an enabling action by the high command) **if Moscow is destroyed** and communication by the high command to the nuclear forces is lost. It has been said that the system could be activated **inadvertently** at a moment of crisis.[The working of Perimetr is better described in our recent paper "Replace LoW Policy"]

**Russia [9]**

**Extinction**

**Rosenbaum, 07** (Ron, award winning journalist and author, “The Return of the Doomsday Machine?”, 8/31/2007, Slate Magazine, <http://www.slate.com/id/2173108/pagenum/all/>)

In Strangelove, the doomsday machine was a Soviet system that automatically detonated some 50 cobalt-jacketed hydrogen bombs pre-positioned around the planet if the doomsday system's sensors detected a nuclear attack on Russian soil. Thus, even an accidental or (as in Strangelove) an unauthorized U.S. nuclear bomb could set off the doomsday machine bombs, releasing enough deadly cobalt fallout to make the **Earth uninhabitable** for the human species for 93 years. No human hand could stop the fully automated apocalypse. An extreme fantasy, yes. But according to a new book called [Doomsday Men](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Doomsday-Men-Strangelove-Dream-Superweapon/dp/0713998156) and several papers on the subject by U.S. analysts, it may not have been merely a fantasy. According to these accounts, the Soviets built and activated a variation of a doomsday machine in the mid-'80s. And there is no evidence Putin's Russia has deactivated the system. Instead, something was reactivated in Russia last week. I'm referring to the ominous announcement—given insufficient attention by most U.S. media (the Economist made it the opening of a lead editorial on Putin's Russia)—by Vladimir Putin that Russia has resumed regular "strategic flights" of nuclear bombers. (They may or may not be carrying nuclear bombs, but you can practically hear Putin's smirking tone as he says, "Our [nuclear bomber] pilots have been grounded for too long. They are happy to start a new life.") These twin developments raise a troubling question: What are the United States' and Russia's current nuclear policies with regard to how and when they will respond to a perceived nuclear attack? In most accounts, once the president or Russian premier receives radar warning of an attack, they have less than 15 minutes to decide whether the warning is valid. The pressure is on to "use it or lose it"—launch our missiles before they can be destroyed in their silos. Pressure that makes the wrong decision more likely. Pressure that makes accidental nuclear war a real possibility. Once you start to poke into this matter, you discover a disturbing level of uncertainty, which leads me to believe we should be demanding that the United States and Russia define and defend their nuclear postures. Bush and Putin should be compelled to tell us just what "failsafe" provisions are installed on their respective nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines—what the current provisions against warning malfunctions are and what kinds of controls there are over the ability of lone madman nuclear bombers to bring on the unhappy end of history. As for the former Soviet Union, the possible existence of a version of a doomsday machine is both relevant and disturbing. In the Strangelove film, the Soviet ambassador tells the president and generals in the U.S. war room that the device was designed to deter a surprise attack, the kind of attack that might otherwise prevent retaliation by "decapitating" the Soviet command structure. The automated system would insure massive world-destroying retaliation even if the entire Soviet leadership were wiped out—or had second thoughts. As a result, some referred to it as the "dead hand" doomsday device. It is Dr. Strangelove himself, the madman U.S. nuclear strategist played by Peter Sellers, who detects the flaw in this plan. After being apprised of the system's existence by the Soviet ambassador, and the likelihood of its being triggered by a U.S. bomber on an unauthorized mission to nuke its Soviet target, Dr. Strangelove exclaims: Yes, but the ... whole point of the doomsday machine ... is lost ... if you keep it a secret! Why didn't you tell the world, eh? In other words, a doomsday machine kept secret is no good for deterrence, only for retaliation by extinction. Did the Soviets actually design a variation on a doomsday device and not tell us about it? And could an accidental or terrorist nuclear attack on Putin's Russia (by Chechens, for instance) trigger an antiquated automated dead-hand system and launch missiles capable of killing tens, maybe hundreds, of millions at unknown targets that might include the United States? Up until Aug. 10 of this year, I would have thought these questions were best consigned to the realm of apocalyptic film fantasy. But on that day I came upon a startling essay in the London Times Literary Supplement. It was a review (titled "Deadly Devices") of a book recently published in the United Kingdom: Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Superweapon by nuclear-age historian P.D. Smith of University College London. (It will be out in the United States in December.) The TLS reviewer, Christopher Coker (who is on the faculty of the London School of Economics), asserted that the book demonstrates that "only after the Berlin Wall had been breached and ... the Cold War began to thaw did military analysts realize the Russians had actually built a version of the [doomsday] device. The details of this top-secret Soviet system were first revealed in 1993 by Bruce G. Blair, a former American ICBM launch control officer, now one of the country's foremost experts on Russian arms. Fearing that a sneak attack by American submarine-launched missiles might take Moscow out in 13 minutes, the Soviet leadership had authorized the construction of an automated communication network, reinforced to withstand a nuclear strike. At its heart was a computer system similar to the one in Dr. Strangelove. Its code name was Perimetr. It went fully operational in January 1985. It is still in place."

**Solvency [1]**

**Contention 3 – Solvency**

**Federal lifting of the restriction solves – now is key**

**Hertel ’11 – professor of nuclear and radiological engineering at Georgia Tech**

**(Nolan E. Hertel, “Pro & Con: Should U.S. lift ban on reprocessing nuclear fuel?”, AJC, 5-16-2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/opinion/pro-con-should-us-lift-ban-on-reprocessing-nuclear/nQtYg/)**

By now there should be no doubt that something ought to be done to remove the ever-increasing amount of spent fuel at nuclear power plants across the United States. If the need to resolve the nuclear waste problem wasn’t evident before, then the threat of release of spent fuel radiation from Japan’s disabled nuclear plant has made it imperative now.¶ **The solution lies with the U.S. Department of Energy**. It needs to move the spent fuel from nuclear power plants to a central location for interim storage, as Congress has directed it to do. But **in the meantime, the government needs to lift a decades-old ban on the use of reprocessing technology to recycle spent fuel**.¶ France, which gets 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, recycles its used fuel. More than a dozen other countries, including Great Britain, Russia and Japan, also utilize it. In the mid-1970s, then-President Jimmy Carter banned U.S. use of the technology on grounds that it would contribute to nuclear proliferation.¶ Now we’re seeing the results of that ill-advised ban. There is 2,410 metric tons of spent fuel stored at the Hatch and Vogtle nuclear plants in Georgia — and the amount is rising each year. Altogether, more than 62,500 tons is kept at nuclear plant sites across the U.S. Spent fuel is not waste. If not for the ban on recycling, valuable uranium and plutonium could be extracted and chemically **reprocessed to** make a mixed-oxide fuel for use in reactors to **generate additional electricity**.¶ Reprocessing is safe and reliable. Despite concerns that separated plutonium from recycling could wind up in the hands of rogue governments or terrorist groups, tight safeguards have prevented any diversion of the nuclear material for weapons production.¶ A blue-ribbon commission of nuclear experts on nuclear-waste management, which was created earlier this year after President Barack Obama terminated the Yucca Mountain project, is considering the revival of recycling. The commission is expected to mobilize our national laboratories for a research effort to develop advanced technologies that increase the value of recycling.¶ Though an abundance of global uranium resources has reduced the commercial appeal of recycling in the near term, the need for it is expected to grow in the years ahead as construction moves along on dozens of nuclear power plants around the world.¶ Therefore, **now is the time to establish a national policy** in support of nuclear recycling, so that we can obtain the full benefits of spent fuel and not continue to store such valuable material as if it’s nuclear waste.

**Removing restrictions and demo project are key—TVA demo solves the treaty and provides a future model for utilities to start reprocessing**

**Wolfe ’12 –** executive director of Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness,

(Clint, formerly chaired the Technical Advisory Panel to the Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, guest article in the Greenville News, 8-10-2012, http://www.c-n-t-a.com/letters.htm#GN1208)

As the need for nuclear power grows, we must pursue serious efforts toward converting nuclear-weapons materials into fuel for power reactors. In particular, reactors can use a Mixed-Oxide fuel made from plutonium to generate enormous amounts of electricity for homes and businesses. A substantial amount of excess plutonium in the U.S. stockpile is now available for this purpose. The Tennessee Valley Authority is considering the use of the mixed-oxide fuel, known as MOX, at its Sequoyah plant near Chattanooga, Tenn., and at its Browns Ferry plant in northern Alabama. TVA's switch from conventional low-enriched uranium to MOX could occur as early as 2018-2020, timed to coincide with the start of MOX production at a facility under construction at the Savannah River Site here in South Carolina. Now half completed, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is one of the largest construction projects in the United States, with 2,200 workers at the site. This project, which is the size of eight football fields, is blazing the trail for the resumption of nuclear quality construction in the United States after a hiatus of 35 years. The idea of using weapons plutonium to make fuel for power reactors was a **key factor** in an **historic** arms-control agreement between the United States and Russia. That pact requires the elimination of 34 metric tons of plutonium by each country, under strict non-proliferation conditions. Combined, that's enough plutonium to arm 17,000 nuclear weapons. Converting that amount of plutonium into MOX fuel, thereby rendering it unsuitable for future military use, will take about 15 years. Though the agreement with Russia calls for eliminating 34 metric tons from each country's weapon stockpile it envisions the elimination of more of the weapons material in the future. Once TVA begins using MOX fuel, **other nuclear utilities are likely to do the same**. MOX is safe and nonthreatening; and the technology for its production and use is well-proven. Developed in this country in the 1960s, MOX was produced from plutonium in spent fuel that is left over from electricity production. MOX was pursued in this country until the mid-1970s, when it was abandoned in the U.S. on grounds that its production could lead to nuclear proliferation. Other countries such as France and Great Britain did not follow the U.S. example, and have continued to recycle plutonium. MOX has been manufactured and used safely and efficiently, with no diversion of plutonium for illicit purposes. Today MOX is used in about 30 power reactors around the world, with more planned units in the licensing stage. And that's the point. TVA's use of MOX could **pave the way** for a resumption of spent-fuel reprocessing in the United States. Indefinite storage of spent fuel in water pools and dry casks at nuclear plant sites around the country is senseless, considering that the material could be converted into MOX for the production of clean energy. When that happens, the amount of nuclear waste for each unit of energy will be reduced by 50 percent. The eventual introduction of new reactor technologies such as small modular reactors and "fast reactors" offers the possibility of recovering even greater amounts of energy from the fuel, thus further reducing the waste burden in an eventual geologic repository. So the use of this fuel makes possible a number of desirable outcomes: namely, producing billions of dollars worth of clean, emission free energy; **satisfying our treaty obligations** with the Russians to dispose of the weapons-grade plutonium thus making the world a safer place; contributing to our quest for energy independence; and reducing the amount of nuclear waste that eventually would be placed in a repository. These are opportunities too good to pass up.

**Solvency [2]**

**Fed key – needs to send the market signal**

**Duarte ‘11**

(Gary J. Duarte, “US Nuclear Energy Foundation A little of our opinion about nuclear fuel reprocessing”, U.S. Nuclear Energy Foundation, 10-12-2011, http://usnuclearenergy.org/REPROCESSING.htm)

To begin with **the massive upfront costs** related to the nuclear energy industry **and** exhaustive **regulation systems** that are **applied by U. S. agencies** to nuclear power plants are responsible for making them the safest large volume 24/7 365 energy producers on the planet. At the same time, we have been trying for 30 years to make renewable sources cost effective and this challenge continues. We have not educated the public throughout the world that nuclear energy “economics” must be “projected” at 60 to 100 years of “operation” as these are what the plants are designed for. Now, these are not “estimates” we have thirty years of nuclear plant track records and zero public fatalities in the U. S. This is unprecedented in ANY other base load power generation method on the planet. The long and short of the reprocessing assessment, since President Reagan “lifted” the U. S. ban on commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels in 1981 has always been the economics (some still believe it is banned, it’s not). A commercial reprocessing facility with the capacity to complete between 800 and 1,000 metric tons annually may cost 10 billion dollars to build in China’s “economics” but 30 billion to build in the U. S. economics. For the past 30 years nearly all of the indecisiveness related to a U. S. reprocessing direction has been the difficulty in facing the economics. Also, over these years, technology has advanced several new and/or different methods for reprocessing, basically introducing yet another decision dilemma. This is why such intense projects have to be decided by the “science community” because the “political community” changes every four-eight years and the capacity to focus is lost. In essence, the DOE and NRC have failed to enlighten Congress and the American public to the scientific need and economic commitment to make reprocessing a “national initiative”; this is what needs to be done. Its costs can only be justified if the program is “painted” as a 100 year mission. Remember, many of us are convinced that America still needs another 150 new nuclear plants to serve our future energy growth and be “energy cost competitive” worldwide. And still, these added plants will also need 6% FINAL deep geologic storage. Then there are those who say that Thorium fuels, pebble bed reactors, etc. will eliminate everything in today’s nuclear waste cycle. Some of our “reality” friends will say many of these are STILL laboratory projects and we will get there in time . . . but we need to START builds based on “TODAY’S functioning technology” over the next twenty years then see where the lab projects are at that time. These same “technology advances” will be occurring with solar and wind, biomass, etc. We must drive these technologies scientifically, but build today’s projects economically. “If” we were to consider a full scale reprocessing facility; estimates are about 12,000 jobs, including 1,000 design jobs during the construction and about 2,500 permanent jobs for decades of operation. A project of this magnitude has the potential to evoke a substantial economic impact on any community and create up to 70,000 jobs overall. Based on the current costs of natural uranium fuel, the “potential value” of the current U. S. stockpile of 66,000 metric tons of commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel would be; $130,000 X 66,000 tons = 8,580,000,000 (8 billion 580 million dollars). We looked at the values of two different opinions, to determine an estimated value of 7 to 11 billion dollars with its reprocessed cost price competitive to natural uranium fuel costs after enrichment. And, as one can see, our current stockpile is only 1/3 the cost for the facility. Now, as we mentioned above, as we build 150 new plants those 6% waste additions will amortize our 30 billion dollar reprocessing facility over 60 – 100 years, fully amortize its cost and generate revenue. (Maybe even be foolish enough to offer “our reprocessing services” to other countries for income and American jobs). With the “experience” of negative U. S. political interests in a strong nuclear build and reprocessing, **NO private company or investors** are going to risk building such a facility until they see the **full “long term” support of the politics** and public policy in America as a “national initiative”. This is the **single largest deterrent** to “commercial scale” reprocessing in the U. S. The science and engineering is accomplished, proven and functional. This entire dialogue that America has studied for 30 years is a fundamental reason that “We the People” must speak up and “separate science from politics” and allow technology to advance the sciences we need to benefit our lives and as a nation be “energy economically competitive”. Science and engineering understand the U. S. need for expanding our nuclear fleet but the government does not, putting most of its attention on (still expensive) renewable energy with only a few waving the nuclear flag. No matter what administration is at the helm, government MUST re-affirm our need for nuclear expansion. Again here, it needs to be a “national initiative”. Nuclear should be re-classified as “green” and allotted government commitment. The nuclear industry has been wrongly battered by government and the environmental movements for years. It needs government to offer the industry 30 – 50% investment tax credits or working loan guarantees for all who build carbon free baseload power, or a tax holiday for the first ten years of operation of carbon free facilities. These incentives would be available to wind, solar and nuclear development. We must raise the success potential for such projects which have been unfairly brutalized in the past.

**Solvency [3]**

**Finally, certainty in government regulatory environments is critical to reprocessing**

**Berry and Tolley 10** – professors of energy and economic policy

(Professors R. Stephen Berry and George S. Tolley, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Future Prospects and Viability”, University of Chicago Humanities, 11-29-2010, http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/institute/bigproblems/Team7-1210.pdf)

The American and French nuclear power industries developed along divergent paths. The U.S. nuclear power industry as a whole experienced a rapid decline beginning in the 1970’s and culminating with the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 (TMI, a partial core meltdown in Reactor 2 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, remains as one of the most significant accidents in the commercial nuclear energy industry in the in the U.S.) 52. Following a period from the mid-1950’s to the mid 1970’s when the U.S. built more nuclear power plants than any other country (231 through 1974), the U.S. only built 15 after 1974 and none after 1977. 53 This shift away from nuclear power was reversed in the late 1990’s as nuclear energy was perceived as a sustainable energy solution to combat specific environmental concerns. In France, the nuclear power industry achieved a successful implementation and was prospering for many years both before and after TMI. Further, in France, nuclear power generates more than 75% of France’s electricity while in the U.S. nuclear power has never accounted for more than 20% of its electricity. 54 These varying paths of nuclear power development in the U.S. and France stem largely from government’s **credible commitment** or lack thereof to the industry. By analyzing the political and regulatory frameworks present in the U.S. and France, it is possible to gain a further understanding of the nuclear power industries in the U.S. and France, but more importantly discern the potential frameworks to develop nuclear reprocessing in the U.S. The differentiation in the U.S. and French nuclear industries was largely based on the government’s level of commitment over time. In the U.S., the government’s commitment to the industry was initially strong, but abated over time, while France’s government maintained a strong commitment over time. 55 **The level of a government’s credible commitment to** the nuclear energy industry and specifically **nuclear reprocessing will play an important role in shaping the flow of capital into the technology**. 56 As the industry is currently constructed, utilities are **sensitive** to licensing and construction costs, which may be **difficult to predict** based on a government’s ability to commit to the industry. Utilities must obtain construction licenses from regulatory bodies to build nuclear facilities. These investment decisions necessitate large sunk costs which must be incurred a number of years prior to operating the plant. **The decision making process of the utility is ultimately influenced by uncertainty surrounding the regulatory process** that can ease or complicate the process. This uncertainty increases the risk associated with these types of investments and disincentivizes investment in the technology. Therefore an “analysis of the differences in institutional environment attributes can further understanding of government’s credible commitment to the industry.” 57 In understanding the existing differentiation in the institutional environment for both the U.S. and France, it is possible to elucidate how these unique situations have created varying transaction costs for their respective industries.

# 2AC

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**Counter-interpretation—restrictions are statutory or regulatory limitations**

**A restriction is a limitation by statute or regulation**

**Burton’s Legal Thesaurus ‘7**

(Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.)

restriction n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision.

**In energy policy, regulations refer to controlling economic entities through rulemaking**

**Energy Information Administration ’12**

(Glossary of Terms, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm)

Regulation: The governmental function of controlling or directing economic entities through the process of rulemaking and adjudication.

**And, rulemaking refers to agency policies that have the force of law**

**Energy Information Administration ’12**

(Glossary of Terms, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm)

Rulemaking (regulations): The authority delegated to administrative agencies by Congress or State legislative bodies to make rules that have the force of law. Frequently, statutory laws that express broad terms of a policy are implemented more specifically by administrative rules, regulations, and practices.

**Rels Solve War**

**US-Russia war causes extinction**

**Bostrom** Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies **2002** Nick [at Yale].. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or **thwart humankind’s potential permanently.**

### AT: Conventional Weapons

**Terrorist want to use nuclear weapons**

**Bunn 2008**, Matthew Bunn is associate professor of public policy and principal investigator in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism—And Next Steps To Reduce The Danger,” Testimony for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, April 2, 2008, <http://www.gale.cengage.com/pdf/samples/sp743081.pdf>

Intelligence reveals that terrorists want access to nuclear weapons, and appalling worldwide nuclear security measures make it plausible that terrorists could gain access to the materials needed to build them. The theft of highly enriched uranium, the material used in nuclear bombs, is not ﬁction, but reality. If terrorists were to use stolen materials to set off a bomb, millions would be killed and the economic and political fallout would be devastating. While no terrorists are currently known to have a nuclear weapon, efforts to improve security of nuclear materials will go a long way to prevent the disastrous risks of their ever obtaining them.

**2AC K**

**Our approach to the 1AC is valid**

**Owen ‘2**

(David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account** available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes** theory-construction from **philosophical first principles,** **it cultivates a theory-driven** rather than problem-driven **approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a **plurality of** possible **true descriptions** of a given action, event or phenomenon, **the challenge is** **to decide** **which is the most apt** in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist** program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the **mistaken belief** that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘**whether there are general explanations** for classes of phenomena **is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’**.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises**.

**No root cause – war causes their impacts**

**Goldstein ‘1**—Professor of International Relations at American University, 2001 (Joshua S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”. Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.  So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression/” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

**Concrete energy policy key—that causes a technocratic fill in and destroys informed agency and informed decision-making in politics**

**Kuzemko 12**

[Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

**Fear of nuclear weapons is good -- becoming blasé about nuclear war risks extinction**

Futterman ‘94

(J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,”<http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html>, AD: 7/11/09)

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states,[[15]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%2215)

"History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view.

Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war."

**Reps don’t shape reality - recognizing threats as socially constructed is useless—changing representational practices doesn’t alter the material reality of state practices or help create better policy for the oppressed**

**Jarvis, 00** (Darryl, lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, International relations and the challenge of postmodernism, 2000, p. 128-130)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom-mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to malce such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod-ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy-vocal, pub-lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo-retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev-olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu-ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the-ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our lmowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des-titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary-or is in some way bad-is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help-ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti-cally excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, poststructural approach a fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana-lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha-sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar-ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality. "39 All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar-ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not malce its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with-out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con-structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real-ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec-ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa-tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse- quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long talcen care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley.40

**Uranium add on**

**Plan solves uranium importation**

**Humi ’11 –** professor at Worcester Polytechnic University

(Mayer Humi, professor at Worcester Polytechnic, “Assessment of Alternative Energy Technologies and Recommendations for a National Energy Policy”, Interactive Qualifying Project Report by undergraduates, 3-9-2011, http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-030811-183047/unrestricted/Assesment\_of\_Alternative\_Energy.pdf)

Once the Uranium has been used in the nuclear reactor until it is deemed as depleted, no longer have the U-235 concentration to undergo fission, the spent fuel rods are placed in on-site water tanks for several years. Even though the Uranium is no longer undergoing fission, it is still emanating heat from the radioactive elements decaying that were created as a result of the fission process. The water pools not only cool the rods, but also protect plant operators from any radiation from the decay occurring. As of 2002, there were 165,000 depleted fuel rod assemblies, stored at 70 locations in the U.S. 76 This is a **major concern** in the U.S. as our current nuclear waste policy does not allow for reprocessing/recycling of the spent fuel. In 1977, President Carter announced, “We will defer 30 indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs.” 77 At the time the rationale was based upon India testing a nuclear weapon made from weapons-grade fuel produced from a civilian energy plant. The movement to eliminate the possibility of further nuclear war was not followed by the rest of the world. Later the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 would be placed into effect, the result of which is a **direct disposal** of commercial reactors and government defense waste and research. 78 As a result of President Carter’s decision to no longer recycle/reprocess nuclear waste, the only means of disposal is storage. A majority of depleted nuclear fuel is stored at the nuclear power plant for several years, after which time it could then be moved to a dry cask storage container with air-cooling for further on-site storage, they are typically special concrete or steel containers. The final step in the U.S. is to collect the on-site storage depleted fuel rods and transport them to a permanent underground repository. There is currently no satisfactory location for this within the U.S. To date there is 60,000 metric tons of commercial used fuel, 13,000 tons of government held used fuel and defense-related high level radioactive waste, and 2000 metric tons produced by the 104 nuclear power plants currently in operation in the U.S. 79 With the primary storage being on-site a permanent storage facility needs to be found, or the policy for reprocessing/recycling needs to be revisited so that future Uranium does not need to be imported. “Owners and operators of U.S. civilian power reactors purchase the equivalent of 53 million pounds [24,000 metric tons] of uranium during 2008.” 80 In 1987 congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act such that the only site for the Department of Energy to conduct a characterization of the geology of Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The site seemed promising as a deep geological repository for high level nuclear waste, as it contains volcanic ash material that is believed to be suitable to store radioactive waste for hundreds of thousands of years required to make radiation levels of the waste projected to be disposed there safe. High opposition in the state of Nevada made any plans to place a facility in the mountains very difficult and as of 2009 the site was deemed unacceptable by the Obama administration, 81 funding was cut to the project in the 2010 budget.31 The other nuclear waste management site currently located in the U.S. is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. It has been in operation since 1999, and is licensed to dispose of transuranic waste and mixed waste generated from the Department of Defense. Transuranic waste consists of radioactive waste with chemical elements that have atomic numbers past Uranium (92). Waste is placed 2150 feet below the surface of the earth in a 3000 foot thick salt formation which has been stable for 250 million years. The site is located in the Salado and Castile Formations 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico in Eddy County. The site has a permit to dispose of waste for 10,000 years that has been left from research and the production of nuclear weapons. 82 As with crude oil, nuclear power is a limited resource with Uranium as the basis of the energy production as opposed to oil. In contrast, Uranium is **semi-renewable** in that once the Uranium rods have been depleted by the fission they can then be re-enriched or used in a breeder reactor which produces more nuclear fuel than it consumes. As mentioned above the U.S. does not partake in the reusing of nuclear waste due to the concerns for creation of nuclear weapons observed in other countries.

**U.S. uranium dependence causes nuclear war**

**Konstantiov 12 –** professor of math at Moscow State and member of numerous scientific/geological councils

(Mihail Konstantiov, Professor of Mathematics with the University of Architecture, Civil Engineering and Geodesy (UACEG), Bulgaria, Vice-Chancellor of UACEG (1999-2003), Member of scientific councils and commissions, Member of the Board of IICREST. He has authored 30 books and over 500 scientific papers. He has participated in international scientific projects of EU and NATO and realized research and lecturing visits in British, German and French universities. Prof. Konstantinov has been Member and Vice Chair of the Central Election Commission of Bulgaria and Voting coordinator of OSCE (1997-) as well as the Bulgarian representative at the Council of Europe on electronic voting. In addition to his scientific publications, he has authored more than 300 articles in Bulgarian editions devoted to social and political issues with emphasis on election practice and legislation., “Uranium time bomb ticking”, Europost, 2-11-2012, http://www.europost.bg/article?id=3763)

In 1945, the US had three nucle­ar bombs - two plu­to­ni­um-based devi­ces and a ura­ni­um-based one. The first one was det­o­nat­ed on a test site in New Mex­i­co, and the sec­ond and third ones over Jap­a­nese ter­ri­to­ry. On 6 August 1945, the then-only ura­ni­um-based bomb was thrown over the Jap­a­nese city of Hiro­shi­ma. What hap­pened is well known and I will not re-tell it. More­over, this sto­ry deals with nucle­ar weap­ons but they are not the main char­ac­ters. Almost 20 years ago, an agree­ment was inked under which the US under­took to help dis­man­tle Rus­sian nucle­ar war­heads and con­vert the ura­ni­um from them into fuel for nucle­ar reac­tors. The rea­son is sim­ple - the pro­ce­dure is expen­sive, Rus­sia was weak and poor at the time, and in addi­tion, Amer­i­can tech­nol­o­gy back then was sig­nif­i­cant­ly ahead of the Rus­sian one. The amounts of con­vert­ed ura­ni­um are mas­sive - more than 500 ton­nes. Thus Rus­sian ura­ni­um turns into fuel for US nucle­ar pow­er plants. At present, this fuel is used to pro­duce 10% of the elec­tri­cal pow­er in the US. This is more than the ener­gy pro­duced from renew­a­ble sour­ces, such as sun, wind and water, there. This idyll, how­e­ver, is com­ing to its end. First, the US-Rus­sia agree­ment for Rus­sian war­heads con­ver­sion expires next year and Rus­sia is high­ly unlike­ly to extend it. More­over, Rus­sians now have good tech­nol­o­gy for that pur­pose and will prob­a­bly want to leave their ura­ni­um for them­selves. And sec­ond, if the agree­ment is extend­ed, the amounts of war­heads sub­ject to dis­man­tling will soon be exhaust­ed any­way as the agreed lim­its are reached. Glob­al mar­kets have already start­ed sus­pect­ing what is going to hap­pen with the expir­ing US-Rus­sia agree­ment for war­head ura­ni­um. And not only with it. Indeed, ura­ni­um oxide pri­ces have **gone wild** sur­ging to almost $70/lb (1lb is 454 gr.) in Jan­u­ary this year from $40/lb in Sep­tem­ber 2011. Such a 70% ral­ly in ura­ni­um price over just 3-4- months is not sus­tain­a­ble and even a cer­tain edg­ing down can be expect­ed. Still, the **trend** is clear - **ura­ni­um dearth** is loom­ing, as well as dearth of oth­er stra­te­gic nat­u­ral resour­ces. We have repeat­ed­ly stat­ed this but let us under­score it again. The glob­al cri­sis is **most of all** a resource cri­sis. It is finan­cial inso­far as it has became clear that the sys­tem allow­ing some peo­ple to print mon­ey while oth­ers work and bring them oil and oth­er goods will not last for good. The antic­i­pat­ed ura­ni­um short­age in the com­ing dec­ade is tru­ly strik­ing and is esti­mat­ed at 500m lb! One of the rea­sons is the fast devel­op­ing econ­o­mies of Chi­na and India, along with oth­er coun­tries like Bra­zil and Tur­key. It is where the bulk of the 147 reac­tors expect­ed to become oper­a­tion­al in these 10 years will be locat­ed. **A major consum­er** of ura­ni­um, the US cur­rent­ly has a demand for 60m lb a year but pro­du­ces only 3m lb. Still, this is the way things are at present. And what will hap­pen aft­er the US Nucle­ar Reg­u­la­to­ry Com­mis­sion reviews and poten­tial­ly approves new nucle­ar reac­tor pro­pos­als? They are 26 or so. And more are in the pipe­line. The sit­u­a­tion in India is even more dra­mat­ic - an increase in the share of nucle­ar ener­gy in elec­tric­i­ty pro­duc­tion is expect­ed from 2.5% at present to 25%. In oth­er words, India will need 10 times as much ura­ni­um as it does now if the far-reach­ing plan is put to prac­tice. Chi­na has more hum­ble aspi­ra­tions and is gear­ing to raise the share of nucle­ar facil­i­ties in elec­tric­i­ty pro­duc­tion only ...three times. And Chi­na, much like the US, does not have suf­fi­cient domes­tic sup­ply. We can con­tin­ue with sta­tis­tics, but things are evi­dent any­way. A war is around the cor­ner. In the best-case sce­nar­io, this will be a price war over ura­ni­um and in par­tic­u­lar ura­ni­um oxide. Pri­ces in the order of $100 or even $200/lb no longer seem far-fetched. Price lev­els of $500-$1000-$2000/lb have even been men­tioned and this will have its swift and dras­tic impli­ca­tions. Still, if a reac­tor costs $4bn, why not pay $1000/lb of ura­ni­um? Or else, the 4-bil­lion invest­ment will go down the drain. Anoth­er explod­ing glob­al mar­ket is the one for rare earth ele­ments with hard-to-pro­nounce Lat­in names such as Neo­dym­i­um, Ceri­um, Lan­tha­num, Gal­li­um, Gado­lin­i­um, Thu­li­um… If we have a look at Men­de­leev's peri­od­ic table, they are squeezed some­where at the bot­tom. But then, all the elec­tron­ics around us, all com­put­ers, fibre optics, all sat­el­lites and in gen­er­al every­thing under­ly­ing our high-tech civ­il­i­za­tion would be utter­ly impos­si­ble but for these exot­ic hard-to-extract ele­ments. The price of each of them has dou­bled and tri­pled in a year alone. And the pri­ces of some of them have soared six­fold in the same peri­od. Com­pared with rare earth ele­ments, gold and plat­i­num are like a tame kit­ten. It nat­u­ral­ly eats and swells but at a rate of only up to 40% a year. And what about the lith­i­um under­ly­ing the idea of elec­tric vehi­cles stag­ing a mass entrance into our dai­ly life and econ­o­my if and when oil is exhaust­ed? But it is in rare ele­ments where the secret of future skir­mish­es over resour­ces lies. Because across the world, they are real­ly hard to extract but Chi­na holds 97% of their glob­al pro­duc­tion! No mis­take, Chi­na pro­du­ces 33 times as much rare met­als as the rest of the world. This may as well be changed some day as cur­rent­ly huge efforts and mon­ey are put into look­ing for rare met­als around the globe. Hypo­thet­i­cal­ly, only a third of the res­erves is in Chi­na with the oth­er two thirds lying some­where else. Too bad it is any­one's guess where, although Cana­da, South Afri­ca and some Afri­can coun­tries are con­sid­ered prom­is­ing in this regard. Still, for the time being this is how things are: Chi­na has almost every­thing and the rest of the world hard­ly any­thing. Does any­one have any doubts why Chi­na has the ambi­tion to become the top dog? Of course, the world is by no means tread­ing water in one oth­er respect: sub­sti­tute tech­nol­o­gies are sought for that would not be so crit­i­cal­ly depend­ent on rare earth ele­ments, yet, more in the long rath­er than short run. By the way, why are we dis­cuss­ing ura­ni­um pri­ces along with all oth­er sorts of pri­ces in US dol­lars? The answer is clear: because the dol­lar is the glob­al reserve cur­ren­cy. The rea­son for this, though, is more com­pli­cat­ed. True, the US is the larg­est econ­o­my for the time being. But it is also among the most indebt­ed coun­tries in the world. And its debt is increas­ing­ly sur­ging. Still, this is not the most impor­tant. The most impor­tant thing is that the US has the most pow­er­ful, most mobile and one of the most effect­ive armies in the world. Lit­tle like­ly is it for some­one to reject the US dol­lar as a reserve cur­ren­cy while the 82nd Air­borne Divi­sion of the US Army, based at Fort Bragg North Car­o­li­na, is the holy ter­ror it is at the moment. And there is much more to it than the 82nd Divi­sion. So the **time bomb** of ura­ni­um and rare earth ele­ments dearth is tick­ing. And lit­tle idea do we have of the time it is set for. Or wheth­er, when it final­ly goes off, some­body might remem­ber the first mas­sive appli­ca­tion of ura­ni­um, which turned thou­sands into ash­es some 67 years ago. **And be temp­ted to use it again**. For 67 years now, we have been show­ing rea­son and sur­viv­ing. Let us hope fierce defi­cien­cy of nat­u­ral resour­ces, food and water that is loom­ing will not take it away from us.

**2AC immigration**

**No impact to current shortages – most recent study**

**Davidson ’12 (Paul, 10/18/12, Study says shortage of skilled workers not that severe,**

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/14/jobs-skills-gap-study/1630359/>**)**

A shortage of skilled manufacturing workers that's blamed for helping push up unemployment is far smaller than believed, according to a study out today.¶ The study by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) says manufacturers may have openings they can't fill, but it's not because workers aren't out there. It's because companies are being too selective about who they hire and are unwilling to pay a competitive wage.¶ JOBS REPORT: More stories on employment¶ The report acknowledges a mild skills gap. U.S. manufacturers could use an additional 80,000 to 100,000 highly skilled employees — less than 1% of all factory workers and less than 8% of highly skilled workers, the study says. Workers in highest demand are welders, machinists and mechanics.¶ But that's far less than the deficit of 600,000 skilled workers cited in a survey last summer by Deloitte and the Manufacturing Institute.¶ "There's a relatively small skills gap that can be managed," says BCG senior partner Hal Sirkin.¶ The study identifies only seven states with significant or severe worker shortages -- Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, and Wyoming. Most have small manufacturing bases, so new manufacturers must draw from sparse worker pools, Sirkin says. Only five of the 50 largest manufacturing centers — Baton Rouge, Charlotte, Miami, San Antonio and Wichita — are seeing a major shortage, the study says. It says 58% of high-skill manufacturing and engineering jobs remain open at least three to six months. But Sirkin says that's partly because employers are not committed enough to hiring the workers.¶ A genuine skills gap would have pushed average annual wage growth 3 percentage points above the rate of inflation over the past five years, the study says, citing a common economic benchmark. Instead, manufacturing wages have grown roughly in line with a below-3% inflation rate.¶ "It's supply and demand," Sirkin says.¶ Also, he says, companies have sharply cut back training of entry-level workers. A skills gap, he says, doesn't exist if manufacturers can train young workers with solid math skills to run computer-controlled machines within a few months.¶ Rather, he says, manufacturers retrenched in the recession. They're producing more with fewer workers who are earning less, and doing little training after chopping human resource budgets. While they could use more skilled workers, they won't bust their budgets to get them and can do without them, Sirkin says.¶

**No impact to econ collapse; recession proves.**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett, ‘09** senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/**2009**, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

**Won’t pass –infighting within the parties**

**Brodwin 2/21/13** – David is a staff writer for US News, The Split Politics of Immigration Reform—And What To Do About It, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/02/21/the-split-politics-of-immigration-reform-and-what-to-do-about-it>

Immigration is caught up in congressional **gridlock**—but it's a gridlock of a unique kind. Unlike so many important issues, the real fight on immigration is not between Republicans and Democrats—it's within each political party. Only when we understand this conflict can we identify a solution.

Within the Republican Party, the Tea Party base of mostly working class and middle class whites opposes immigration out of fear of competition for jobs driving down wages. And—let's be honest—in some cases racism plays a role. But other parts of the Republican Party strongly support a relaxed immigration policy: employers in agriculture and other industries that depend on cheap immigrant labor; and Republican political strategists who rightly fear the rapid growth in Latino voters, who tend to vote for Democrats. The Republican Party is a house divided.

The Democratic Party is also divided. Many (but not all) Latino groups favor looser immigration laws. But labor unions, an essential source of money and organizing capacity vital to Democrats, have long opposed a guest worker program. The guest worker program is a central part—perhaps an inescapable part—of comprehensive immigration reform proposals.

[[See a collection of political cartoons on Congress](http://www.usnews.com/cartoons/congress-cartoons).]

Given the conflicts within the parties, it's not surprising that **little progress** has been made to date. Both parties have a vested interest in appearing to support comprehensive reform without ever reaching agreement.

**GOP supports expansion of nuclear power**

**Trembath 2/4/11 (Alex, Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, “Nuclear Power and the Future of Post-Partisan Energy Policy”)** <http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/>

But that was last year. The changing of the guard in Congress makes this a whole different game, and the once feasible support for nuclear technology on either side of the aisle must be reevaluated. A New York Times [piece](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/business/energy-environment/17NUCLEAR.html) in the aftermath of the elections forecast a difficult road ahead for nuclear energy policy, but did note Republican support for programs like a waste disposal site and loan guarantees. Republican support for nuclear energy has roots in the most significant recent energy legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which passed provisions for nuclear power with wide bipartisan support. Reaching out to Republicans on policies they have supported in the past should be a goal of Democrats who wish to form a foundational debate on moving the policy forward. There are also signals that key Republicans, notably [Lindsey Graham](http://washingtonindependent.com/99171/graham-circulating-clean-energy-standard) and[Richard Lugar](http://www.plattsenergyweektv.com/story.aspx?storyid=132784&catid=293), would throw their support behind a clean energy standard that includes nuclear and CCS. Republicans in Congress will find intellectual support from a group that AEL’s Teryn Norris coined [“innovation hawks,”](http://leadenergy.org/2011/01/the-rise-of-innovation-hawks/) among them Steven Hayward, David Brooks and George Will. Will has been [particularly outspoken](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/08/this-nuclear-option-is-nuclear.html) in support of nuclear energy, writing in 2010 that “it is a travesty that the nation that first harnessed nuclear energy has neglected it so long because fads about supposed ‘green energy’ and superstitions about nuclear power’s dangers.”

**Vote no – voting neg means the plan is presented and voted down in congress – PC is inevitable**

**PC theory is wrong- winners win**

*-add green highlighting for immigration*

**Hirsh, 2-7** – National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists

[Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

**There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital**

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get itwrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of **this** talk **will have no bearing on what actually happens** over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The **political tectonics** have **shift**ed **dramatically in very little time**. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, **political capital** is a concept that **misleads** far more than it enlightens. **It is** **distortionary**. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it **discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything**. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “**Winning wins.”** In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some **political scientists** **who study** the elusive calculus of **how to pass legislation** and run successful presidencies **say** that **political capital is**, at best, **an empty concept**, and that **almost nothing in** the **academic literature** successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. **Winning** on one issue often **changes the** **calculation** for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where **the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants**, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the **other actors**” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may **change positions to get on the winning side**. **It’s a bandwagon effect**.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]**he’s** aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

[Matt note: gender paraphrased]

**Budget thumps**

**Collinson 2/20** – White House correspondent, journalist in AFP Washington Bureau (Stephen, “US economy at risk in new Obama, Republicans clash,” http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h0hIFYKhhoZb\_NN2CXP8Ayi9iaYQ?docId=CNG.ce95731e41eb8b64cf7fd20fffdfe2af.c1)

Fresh from a debt ceiling showdown and year-end fiscal cliff brinkmanship, President Barack **Obama** and Republicans are now **locked in a test of wills** over huge budget cuts due to come into force on March 1. The White House and independent analysts fear the so-called "sequester" could cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and crimp already slow economic growth, and there is little hope in Washington that it can be averted. THE SEQUESTER The sequester, a multi-billion dollar package of spending cuts, was designed never to come into force. It is a measure of the political estrangement in Washington that it looks certain to do so. The idea was that the cuts would be so devastating to domestic spending favored by Democrats and defense spending beloved of Republicans that they would have no choice but to get together on a deal to cut the deficit. But no deal is done and prospects of a last-minute agreement seem slim. So on March 1, cuts that will slash defense spending by $55 billion and non-defense discretionary spending by $27 billion this year look set to come into force. In a wider sense, the sequester is just the latest reflection of starkly differing political philosophies dividing Washington. Republicans see bloated spending driving the economy to disaster. Obama refuses to countenance social programs being decimated or the imposition of a budget that is balanced in a way that he says will hurt the middle class. THE COST The cost of the sequester, if allowed to unfold in full, could be devastating, in human and economic terms. The Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington estimates that one million jobs could be lost. The Congressional Budget Office predicts growth, already down by 0.1 percent last quarter, could slip 0.7 percent as government departments and related businesses stagger under the sequester's impact. Obama, **seeking to pressure Republicans** into a deal, paints a dire picture of misery to come after March 1. "If Congress allows this meat cleaver approach to take place, it will jeopardize our military readiness," Obama said Tuesday, warning emergency workers could be also hampered and thousands of teachers could be laid off. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned Wednesday almost all the Pentagon's 800,000 civilian employees would face furloughs starting in April. The military will cut back on training and repairs while the Navy has halted the deployment of the aircraft carrier Harry S Truman to the Gulf. THE POLITICS The sequester showdown has degenerated into a game of who will blink first, likely to climax after the sequester goes into effect. Right now, neither side can even agree on who came up with the idea of the sequester. Republicans **blame Obama**. The White House notes that both chambers of Congress passed it. The White House is confident, **flexing muscle** after Obama's re-election win and triumph over Republicans in the fiscal cliff tax showdown. Obama is proposing a "balanced" package of spending cuts and increases in revenue from closing tax cut loopholes in a "buy down" solution so Congress can come up with a long-term budget deal to end successive budget crises. His **hardball media strategy** is rooted in a bid to saddle Republicans in the unpopular Congress with the blame for the calamitous post-sequester scenarios. "Americans will lose their jobs because Republicans made a choice for that to happen," White House spokesman Jay Carney said. Republicans are adamant the rise in tax rates for the wealthy they conceded last year is all the revenue Obama is going to get. Some conservatives are relaxed about the sequester -- as their focus is purely on cutting spending. But House Republican Speaker John Boehner said in a Wall Street Journal op-ed Wednesday it was an "ugly and dangerous" way to cut the deficit. "Mr President, we agree that your sequester is bad policy. What spending are you willing to cut to replace it?" Boehner wrote. The Obama-backed Democratic plan to forestall the sequester is not cutting much ice either. "I wouldn't line my bird cage with it, and I don't have a bird," Republican congressman Trey Gowdy told AFP. THE LIKELY ENDGAME Privately, White House officials believe that pressure on Republicans will get so great that they will be forced into a spending and revenues deal. The politics seem to favor the president -- he is more popular than Republicans and polls show voters like the idea of more taxes for the rich. The danger for Obama is that if the sequester is not quickly fixed and the economy is damaged his presidential legacy is on the line. **Political capital** he needs to drive through key second-term agenda items such as immigration reform and gun control could ///also be **tarnished. Obama will crank up the blame game next week** with campaign-style visits to regions likely to be hit by the sequester cuts.

**Laundry list thumps**

**Stevenson 2/17** – political reporter at Tuscaloosa News (Tommy, “AT LARGE: Obama tells GOP ‘my way or the highway’,” http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20130217/NEWS/130219806?p=3&tc=pg)

After all, when the gun control debate exploded again after the Sandy Hook massacre in Connecticut, Obama was quick to point out that exit polls showed that 60 percent of the voters supported his position in favor of more gun restrictions. There was more evidence to believe Obama thinks he is indeed **flush with political capital** and public support in his State of the Union address Tuesday. In an almost **my-way-or-the-highway tone** of voice, Obama enunciated **a specific**, traditionally liberal **agenda** for the next four years while at the same time reminding Congress (or at least the filibuster-prone Republicans in the Democrat-controlled Senate and the GOP majority in the House) that the nation is fed up with gridlock and a Congress that does little but lurch from artificial crisis to artificial crisis. Even as Republicans are insisting on spending cuts to match any new federal spending, **Obama pushed** for, among other things, more spending for: n Universal preschool for all children 4 or older; n An ambitious program for construction work on bridges and schools and the rest of America’s crumbling infrastructure; n A New Deal-like jobs program renovating vacant homes in rundown neighborhoods; n An increase in the minimum wage for the first time in six years to $9 an hour, with future increases tied to the cost of living, a proposal that has already sent some **skittish Republicans** looking for a more modest minimum wage plan of their own. Obama also continued to push for support of progressive social issues including gun control, immigration reform, climate change and advancing equal rights for gays. His rhetorical “let them vote!” call for stricter background checks for gun buyers, and bans of certain types of firearms and ammunition quickly became the emotional high point of his address as Democrats picked up the chant each time Obama mentioned the site of a gun atrocity or invoked the name of a victim of gun violence. Those whom Obama would “let” vote are, of course, Republican members of Congress, who have a habit of preventing votes on issues that may come back to haunt them by threatening filibusters in the Senate and by never even bringing up Democratic initiatives in the House. Obama clearly wants **every member of Congress** on the record on gun control, which in a broad, generic sense is becoming more popular by the day. He wants the lawmakers, especially GOP House members, all of whom are up for re-election next year, to have to go home and explain why they voted against banning the possession of weapons of war and the 100-bullet clips some of them can hold.

**Trade Off**

**Chinese soft power down now- expansionism**

**Ackerman, 1-31** – Signal magazine editor-in-chief

[Robert, "China Behavior Increasingly Troublesome to Neighbors," Signal Online, 1-31-13, www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/10625, accessed 2-2-13, mss]

As the People’s Republic of China grows in economic and military stature, it is **generating ill will** among neighbors who increasingly fear an expansionist budding superpower. Ironically, the greatest effect this is having on the Asia-Pacific region is that it is driving many nations into the arms of the United States. This was just one of many observations offered by a panel on China at AFCEA/USNI West 2013 in San Diego. A mix of academics and military officers offered different perspectives on where China might be headed in the coming years. Capt. Jim Fanell, USN, deputy chief of staff for intelligence and information operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet, said that China has taken control of areas outside its borders that never have been administered to, or controlled by, any government of China in recent history. China’s coastal cutters seem to have **no other mission than to harass others** to submit to its territorial claims. The result is that the countries of East Asia “now remember why they like the United States,” he said. Dr. Jacqueline Deal, president and chief executive officer, Long-Term Strategy Group, related how China’s foreign minister told then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that, “there are great powers, and there are small powers—and that’s a fact.” This statement amounted to tacit approval for the Middle Kingdom to push its neighbors around, Deal said. Maj. Christopher I. Johnson, USMC, Olmsted scholar, Hong Kong University, and logistics officer, Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., observed that China’s leaders believe in hard power—“you cannot export soft power.” Yet, Johnson believes that China currently is a competitor, not an enemy

**DA’s inevitable—**

1. **Public wants more nuclear power and it’s expanding globally**

**Westenhaus 9/30**

(Brian, “Confidence in Nuclear Power is on the Rise Again”, Oil Price, 9-30-2012, <http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Confidence-in-Nuclear-Power-is-on-the-Rise-Again.html>)

This latest survey found that Americans strongly favoring nuclear energy outnumber those strongly opposed by a two-to-one ratio, 29% versus 14%. The new numbers improve on a poll conducted in September 2011, six months after the Fukushima accident, when 62% of American favored nuclear energy, with 35% opposed. The new survey shows confidence is improving. Just over three quarters of respondents agree that nuclear energy facilities operating in the United States are ‘safe and secure,’ while only 19% think they are not. Eighty percent of Americans opposed to 16% believe “we should learn the lessons from the Japanese accident and continue to develop advanced nuclear energy plants to meet America’s growing electricity demand.” In a shock to the political system and the anti nuclear crowd a large majority (81%) of those surveyed favor the renewal of operating licenses of facilities that continue to meet federal safety standards, while 74% believe electric utilities should prepare now so they will be ready to build new nuclear power plants in the next decade if needed. The U.S. is not alone. New nuclear plants are coming in Asia and even in Europe. Nuclear generating capacity is projected to grow 38% in the next eight years. These kinds of numbers wake up the uranium commodities speculators – even while the market is in the doldrums.

1. **Nuclear power’s expanding in the U.S. now**

**Ferguson ’12**

(Charles D., Federation of the American Scientists, Public Interest Report, “Making the Case for

Nuclear Power in the United States”, Summer 2012, <http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/2012summer/Summer2012_PresidentMessage.pdf>)

Will nuclear power in the United States flourish or fade away? To paraphrase Mark Twain, “The news of nuclear power’s demise has been greatly exaggerated.” The United States still has the largest number of nuclear reactors in the world with 104 and almost 20 percent of its electricity is generated from nuclear power. Moreover, four new reactors are under construction: two at the Vogtle plant in Georgia and two at the Summer plant in South Carolina. One big reason these plants are moving forward is because the utilities can recoup some of the costs during construction. The regional regulatory authorities in the Southeastern United States have allowed such cost recovery. Four new reactors, however, will not be enough to keep nuclear power on pace to continue to generate about 20 percent of the nation’s electricity.

**Zero link to the Aff—all of their evidence is about new nuclear power plant construction,**

1. **Reprocessing marginally affects investor calculations about nuclear power**

**Lee 10**

[Nathan R. Lee, WISE Intern and B.S.E. in Materials Science & Engineering from UPenn, Sustainability Of U.S. Nuclear Energy: Waste Management And The Question Of Reprocessing American Nuclear Society, 2010, <http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2010/NathanLeeWISE2010.pdf>]

Even if breakeven prices are never reached, there is still an economic argument that supports reprocessing. In some countries, there is a high cost associated with being dependent on a foreign supplier of fuel. For those risk-averse countries that demand energy security, there might be an economic advantage to reprocessing used nuclear fuel domestically even if it entails more direct costs. Conventional one-pass Pu recycling reduces uranium demand by 11%; a full recycle would do so by more than two orders of magnitude. 47 However, despite the fact that the United States is dependent on foreign sources of uranium, its close relationships with supplier states reduce the relevance of this argument. Finally, it is important to note that **the economic ramifications of changing the fuel cycle are** quite **small** compared to other parts of the nuclear energy industry. Capital, operations, and maintenance account for 80-90% of total generation costs, **dwarfing the significance of fuel cycle economics**. Although fuel cycle costs are not immaterial, they should not be the principal driving factor in a policy decision. 48

1. **Reprocessing plants are NOT nuclear power plants—waste from plants gets sent there to be created into new fuel**

**Feiveson et al ’11**

(Harold, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, “Managing Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors: Experience and Lessons from Around the World”, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2011, <http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/ipfm/Managing-Spent-Fuel-Sept-2011.pdf>)

Nuclear power reactors today are fueled mostly with uranium, which undergoes a fission chain reaction releasing heat and creating radioactive fission products and plutonium and other transuranic elements. After a time, the concentration of chain-reacting isotopes drops to the point where the fuel is considered “spent” and has to be replaced with fresh fuel. Spent nuclear fuel from power reactors is unloaded into a water-filled pool immediately adjacent to the reactor to allow its heat and radiation levels to decrease. It is held in these pools for periods ranging from a few years to decades. After cooling, the fuel may be transferred to massive air-cooled dry casks for storage on site or in a centralized facility. 1 OverviewManaging Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors 3 In a few countries, the fuel is sent to a reprocessing plant, where the fuel is dissolved and the plutonium and uranium recovered for potential use in reactor fuel. These processes also produce high-level wastes that contain much of the radioactive content of the spent fuel as well as other streams of radioactive waste, including plutonium waste from the manufacture of plutonium-containing fuel.

# 1AR

### AT: Chulpka

 **Their criticism's totalizing position shuts down movements; endorsing both strategies for change creates space for an activist politics**

**Krishna,** Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, **1993** [Sankaran, Alternatives, Summer, p. 400-401]

Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy' choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions//////////

, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is compromised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling- reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialism in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

### AT: VTL

#### Extinction first—every being has life, have to save the most lives possible

**BERNSTEIN ‘2**

(Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent in **organic** being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise **the conditions for** an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive:** "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

### AT:Terror

#### Terrorism rhetoric is vital to stigmatizing terrorist legitimacy and to eliminating violence against civilians as a means to attain political goals

**Ganor 01**

(Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “Defining Terrorism”, <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm>)

The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations—guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc.—are often used to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Naturally, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, such as “revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry fewer negative connotations than the term, “terrorism.” Terrorism or Revolutionary Violence? Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad) was Yasser Arafat’s deputy and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September. He was responsible for a number of lethal attacks, including the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In order to rationalize such actions, he used the tactic of confounding “terrorism” with “political violence,” stating, “By nature, and even on ideological grounds, I am firmly opposed to political murder and, more generally, to terrorism. Nevertheless, unlike many others, I do not confuse revolutionary violence with terrorism, or operations that constitute political acts with others that do not.”[[4](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#4)] Abu Iyad tries to present terrorism and political violence as two different and unconnected phenomena. The implication of this statement is that a political motive makes the activity respectable, and the end justifies the means. I will examine this point below. Terrorism or National Liberation? A rather widespread attempt to make all definitions of terrorism meaningless is to lump together terrorist activities and the struggle to achieve national liberation. Thus, for instance, the recurrently stated Syrian official position is that Syria does not assist terrorist organizations; rather, it supports national liberation movements. President Hafez el-Assad, in a November 1986 speech to the participants in the 21st Convention of Workers Unions in Syria, said the following: We have always opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing and a national struggle against occupation is another. We are against terrorism… Nevertheless, we support the struggle against occupation waged by national liberation movements.[[5](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%225)] The attempt to confound the concepts of “terrorism” and “national liberation” comes to the fore in various official pronouncements from the Arab world. For instance, the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait, at the beginning of 1987, stated in its resolutions that: The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from the legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values, and by international conventions.[[6](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%226)] The foreign and interior ministers of the Arab League reiterated this position at their April 1998 meeting in Cairo. In a document entitled “Arab Strategy in the Struggle against Terrorism,” they emphasized that belligerent activities aimed at “liberation and self determination” are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults.[[7](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#7)] Here again we notice an attempt to justify the “means” (terrorism) in terms of the “end” (national liberation). Regardless of the nature of the operation, when we speak of “liberation from the yoke of a foreign occupation” this will not be terrorism but a legitimate and justified activity. This is the source of the cliché, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which stresses that all depends on the perspective and the worldview of the one doing the defining. The former President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, made the following statement in April 1981, during the visit of the Libyan ruler, Muamar Qadhafi: “Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as ‘terrorism’.”[[8](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#8)] Surprisingly, many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for “national liberation” would appear to be the positive and justified end of this sequence, whereas terrorism is the negative and odious one. It is impossible, according to this approach, for any organization to be both a terrorist group and a movement for national liberation at the same time. In failing to understand the difference between these two concepts, many have, in effect, been caught in a semantic trap laid by the terrorist organizations and their allies. They have attempted to contend with the clichés of national liberation by resorting to odd arguments, instead of stating that when a group or organization chooses terrorism as a means, the aim of their struggle cannot be used to justify their actions (see below). Thus, for instance, Senator Jackson was quoted in Benyamin Netanyahu’s book Terrorism: How the West Can Win as saying, The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do . . . It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.[[9](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#9)] Professor Benzion Netanyahu also assumed, a priori, that freedom fighters are incapable of perpetrating terrorist acts: For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately attacked innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or passersby in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen to reside in the area of conflict or are merely associated ethnically or religiously with the people of that area… The conclusion we must draw from all this is evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement . . .[[10](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%2210)] This approach strengthens the attempt by terrorist organizations to present terrorism and the struggle for liberation as two contradictory concepts. It thus plays into the terrorists’ hands by supporting their claim that, since they are struggling to remove someone they consider a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. The claim that a freedom fighter cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing is, of course, groundless. A terrorist organization can also be a movement of national liberation, and the concepts of “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” are not mutually contradictory. Targeting “the innocent”? Not only terrorists and their allies use the definition of terrorism to promote their own goals and needs. Politicians in countries affected by terrorism at times make political use of the definition of terrorism by attempting to emphasize its brutality. One of the prevalent ways of illustrating the cruelty and inhumanity of terrorists is to present them as harming “the innocent.” Thus, in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Binyamin Netanyahu states that terrorism is “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”[[11](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#11)] This definition was changed in Netanyahu’s third book, Fighting Terrorism, when the phrase “the innocent” was replaced by the term “civilians”: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”[[12](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#12)] “Innocent” (as opposed to “civilian”) is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terrorism. The use of the concept “innocent” in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the political game. The dilemma entailed by the use of the term “innocent” is amply illustrated in the following statement by Abu Iyad: As much as we repudiate any activity that endangers innocent lives, that is, against civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we feel no remorse concerning attacks against Israeli military and political elements who wage war against the Palestinian people . . . Israeli acts of vengeance usually result in high casualties among Palestinian civilians—particularly when the Israeli Air Force blindly and savagely bombs refugee camps—and it is only natural that we should respond in appropriate ways to deter the enemy from continuing its slaughter of innocent victims.”[[13](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#13)] Abu Iyad here clarifies that innocent victims are civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (implying that civilians in Israel, even children and old people, are not innocent), while he describes Palestinian civilians as innocent victims. Proposing a Definition of Terrorism The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed-upon foundation for academic research, as well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. The definition proposed here states that terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. **Continues…** This distinction between the target of the attack and its aims shows that the discrepancy between “terrorism” and “freedom fighting” is not a subjective difference reflecting the personal viewpoint of the definer. Rather it constitutes an essential difference, involving a clear distinction between the perpetrators’ aims and their mode of operation. As noted, an organization is defined as “terrorist” because of its mode of operation and its target of attack, whereas calling something a “struggle for liberation” has to do with the aim that the organization seeks to attain. Diagram 2 illustrates that non-conventional war (between a state and an organization), may include both terrorism and guerrilla activities on the background of different and unrelated aims. Hiding behind the guise of national liberation does not release terrorists from responsibility for their actions. Not only is it untrue that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” but it is also untrue that “the end justifies the means.” The end of national liberation may, in some cases, justify recourse to violence, in an attempt to solve the problem that led to the emergence of a particular organization in the first place. Nevertheless, the organization must still act according to the rules of war, directing its activities toward the conquest of military and security targets; in short, it must confine itself to guerrilla activities. When the organization breaks these rules and intentionally targets civilians, it becomes a terrorist organization, according to objective measures, and not according to the subjective perception of the definer. It may be difficult at times to determine whether the victim of an attack was indeed a civilian, or whether the attack was intentional. These cases could be placed under the rubric of a “gray area,” to be decided in line with the evidence and through the exercise of judicial discretion. The proposed definition may therefore be useful in the legal realm as a criterion for defining and categorizing the perpetrators’ activities. In any event, adopting the proposed definition of terrorism will considerably reduce the “gray area” to a few marginal cases. Defining States’ Involvement in Terrorism **Continues…** supporting terrorism – terrorist organizations often rely on the assistance of a sympathetic civilian population. An effective instrument in the limitation of terrorist activity is to undermine the ability of the organization to obtain support, assistance, and aid from this population. A definition of terrorism could be helpful here too by determining new rules of the game in both the local and the international sphere. Any organization contemplating the use of terrorism to attain its political aims will have to risk losing its legitimacy, even with the population that supports its aims. Public relations – a definition that separates terrorism out from other violent actions will enable the initiation of an international campaign designed to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist organizations, curtail support for them, and galvanize a united international front against them. In order to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist activity (usually stemming from the tendency of various countries to identify with some of the aims of terrorist organizations), terrorist activity must be distinguished from guerrilla activity, as two forms of violent struggle reflecting different levels of illegitimacy. The Attitude of Terrorist Organizations Toward the Definition The definition of terrorism does not require that the terrorist organizations themselves accept it as such. Nevertheless, reaching international agreement will be easier the more objective the definition, and the more the definition takes into account the demands and viewpoints of terrorist organizations and their supporters. The proposed definition, as noted, draws a distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare at both the conceptual and moral levels. If properly applied, it could challenge organizations that are presently involved in terrorism to abandon it so as to engage exclusively in guerrilla warfare. As noted, most organizations active today in the national and international arena engage in both terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare; after all, international convention makes no distinction between the two. Hence, there are no rules defining what is forbidden and what is allowed in non-conventional war, and equal punishments are imposed on both terrorists and guerrilla fighters. People perpetrating terrorist attacks or engaging in guerrilla warfare know they can expect the same punishment, whether they attack a military installation or take over a kindergarten. The terrorist attack may be more heavily censored because it involves children, but the legitimacy of these actions will be inferred from their political aims. In these circumstances, why not prefer a terrorist attack that will have far more impact, and will be easier to accomplish, with much less risk? The international adoption of the proposed definition, with its distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare—and its concomitant separation from political aims—could motivate the perpetrators to reconsider their intentions, choosing military targets over civilian targets—guerrilla warfare over terrorism–both because of moral considerations and because of “cost-benefit” considerations. The moral consideration – many terrorist organizations are troubled by the moral question bearing on their right to harm civilians, and this concern is reflected in their literature and in interviews with terrorists. Thus, for instance, an activist of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Walid Salam, argued in December 1996 that “among activists of the Popular Front, more and more are opposed to military activities against civilians, as the one near Ramallah on Wednesday. They do not say so publicly because of internal discipline and to preserve unity.”[[27](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#27)] We can also see something of this moral dilemma in Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the leader of Hamas: “According to our religion it is forbidden to kill a woman, a baby, or an old man, but when you kill my sister, and my daughter, and my son, it is my right to defend them.”[[28](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#28)] This concern might explain why, after attacks on civilian targets, organizations such as Hamas often make public statements proclaiming that they have attacked military targets. The moral dilemma does exist, and the opponents of terrorism must intensify it. When countries acknowledge the principle of relying on guerrilla warfare to attain legitimate political aims, and unite in their moral condemnation of terrorism, they increase the moral dilemma that is already prevalent in terrorist organizations. The utilitarian consideration – If the perpetrators know that attacking a kindergarten or other civilian target will never be acceptable; that these attacks will turn them into wanted and extraditable terrorists and will undermine the legitimacy of their political goals—and that, when apprehended, they will be punished much more harshly than would guerrilla fighters—they may think twice before choosing terrorism as their modus operandi. Adopting the proposed definition of terrorism, formulating rules of behavior, and setting appropriate punishments in line with the proposed definition will sharpen the “cost-benefit” considerations of terrorist organizations. One way of encouraging this trend among terrorist organizations is, as noted, to agree on different punishments for those convicted of terrorism and those convicted of guerrilla warfare. Thus, for instance, the possibility should be considered of bringing to criminal trial, under specific charges of terrorism, individuals involved in terrorist activities, while allotting prisoner of war status to those accused of involvement in guerrilla activities. The proposed definition of terrorism may indeed help in the struggle against terrorism at many and varied operative levels. An accepted definition, capable of serving as a basis for international counter-terrorist activity, could above all, bring terrorist organizations to reconsider their actions. They must face the question of whether they will persist in terrorist attacks and risk all that such persistence entails—loosing legitimacy, incurring harsh and specific punishments, facing a coordinated international opposition (including military activity), and suffering harm to sources of support and revenue. The international community must encourage the moral and utilitarian dilemmas of terrorist organizations, and establish a clear policy accompanied by adequate means of punishment on the basis of an accepted definition. Summary We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

### AT: Pan

**Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur**

**Macy 1995** (Joanna, general systems scholar and deep ecologist, Ecopsychology)

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.